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TRANSLATING SYMPATHY FOR DECEIVED CONSUMERS
INTO EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS FOR PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumers, by definition, include us all. They are the largest
economic group in the economy, affecting and affected by almost
every public and private economic decision. Two-thirds of all
spending in the economy is by consumers. But they are the only
important group in the economy who are not effectively organized,
whose views are often not heard...
If consumers are offered inferior products, if prices are ex-
orbitant, if drugs are unsafe or worthless, if the consumer is
unable to choose on an informed basis, then his dollar is wasted,
his health and safety may be threatened, and the national interest
suffers.'
The public is constantly confronted with deceptive advertising, dis-
honest selling practices, and substandard workmanship and materials.
At least two billion dollars' worth of counterfeit brand name goods will be
sold in the United States this year.2 "[F]ix-up phonies' . . . are cheat-
ing American homeowners of an estimated billion dollars a year." a "One
billion dollars was mentioned most often as the cost of quackery in the
United States." 4
With the tremendous expansion of consumer credit since World War
11 5 and the accompanying "nefarious, unscrupulous and improper practices
[that] exist in certain areas of consumer credit," 6 an acute necessity for
1 108 CONG. REC. 4167, 4263 (1962) (message from President Kennedy to Con-
gress concerning strength of programs to protect consumer interests).
2Do You Know What You Are Buying?, Saturday Evening Post, July 9, 1955,
p. 28.
3 Dickenson, Watch Out for Phony Household Repairmen, Reader's Digest, Jan.
1962, p. 83.
4 SUBcoMxMTTE ON FRAUDs AND MISREPRESENTATIONS AFFECTING THE ELDERLY,
89TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON FRAUDS AND DECEPTIONS AFFECTING THE ELDERLY 8
(Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON FRAUDS].
5 Total outstanding consumer credit (excluding real estate mortgage credit) grew
from $7,222,000,000 in 1939 to $69,890,000,000 in 1963. 50 FED. RESERVE BULL. 376
(1964). For a list of authorities concerning consumer credit see CURRAN, TRENDS
IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 1 n.1 (1965).
6 Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
in the Matter of: Commercial Credit Financing Fields, Pursuant to Senate Resolution,
Serial No. 4, Sess. 1962, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 15, 1963, at 19.
These hearings were conducted on four separate days: May 10, 1962, at Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania; May 25, 1962, at Ridgway, Pennsylvania; June 13, 1962, at
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and May 15, 1963, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The
hearings will hereinafter be cited as "Donolow Committee Hearings" and the appro-
priate date will be included.
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protecting consumers has arisen. While consumer problems are to a
great extent due to the exploitation of the elderly 7 and the uneducated
poor,8 the problems are by no means foreign to the better educated and
wealthy.9 It is "incredible that a wealthy nation, priding itself on its
enlightenment and its thirst for progress, should pay such a heavy penalty
for ignorance or lack of adequate enforcement." 10
This Comment is the result of a field research project " designed to
ascertain what protection against fraudulent sellers is afforded the con-
sumer and to suggest methods of achieving greater protection. Interviews
with persons who in their organizational or governmental capacities might
help the consumer more effectively were held in New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania,12 while correspondence was conducted with persons
throughout the country. Special emphasis is given throughout the Com-
ment to Pennsylvania problems and practices with an indication of the
typical nature of the state's experience in particular areas.
Despite President Johnson's "intensified campaign . . . against the
selfish minority who defraud and deceive consumers, charge unfair prices,
or engage in other sharp practices," 18 despite movements in many states
to set up consumer councils,14 and despite greater awareness of consumer
7 "lIt is shameful that the elderly of the United States are now clearly the
major victims of the highly organized, high-pressure techniques of the modern day
medicine man." REPORT oN FRAUDS 1. See generally id. at 1-77.
S Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL Am BRIEF CASE 143 (1965); 110
CONG. REc. 1958, 1960 (1964) (message from President Johnson to Congress con-
cerning consumer interests).
9 An important trade union officer, high in the councils of the labor move-
ment in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania admitted to me readily that he
has on at least a half dozen occasions been the victim of such high pressure
salesmanship at a time when he himself was engaged in lecturing trade union
audiences about the need for exercising care and caution in entering into
installment sales agreements.
Donolow Committee Hearings, May 15, 1963, p. 13 (testimony of Harry Boyer,
President, Pennsylvania AFL-CIO).
10 REPORT ON FRAUDS 1.
11 The Law Reviewu wishes to express its appreciation to the Thomas Skelton
Harrison Foundation for providing funds so that an interview method of research
could be employed in this study.
, 12 Personal interviews were held during the summer of 1965 with district attor-
neys, better business bureau representatives, editorial staffs of consumer testing maga-
zines, police detectives, bank and finance company counsel and management, consumer
council staffs, deputy attorneys general, post office inspectors, legal aid counsel, a
magistrate, a United States attorney, newspaper advertising managers, state senators,
senate investigating committee counsel, and numerous private attorneys.
Where the person interviewed is a member of a class of persons who might be
expected to provide similar information about a particular facet of the consumer
fraud problem, only his position is indicated, either in the text or footnote. Names
of persons quoted are supplied only where identity is particularly relevant.
'3 110 CONG. Rzc. 1958, 2095 (1964) (message from President Johnson to Con-
gress concerning consumer interests).
14 See National Better Business Bureau, The Growth of State Consumer Frauds
Bureaus, June 1965; Warne, Consumer Protective Movements on the State and
Local Levels-1964, May, 1964 unpublished manuscript on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania. See also pp. 430-34 infra.
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problems on the local level,15 the consensus among those interviewed was
that the defrauded consumer had very little chance of obtaining satisfactory
relief. The consumer is faced by a set of legal concepts traditionally prem-
ised on the "caveat emptor" doctrine.16  He is unprotected by state legis-
latures since no lobby exerts pressure for laws to protect him,17 and sellers
cheat him because of a belief that they are "locked in a no-holds-barred
contest forced on . . . [them] by cutthroat competition." 18
While the solution proposed by many is business self-regulation,19
unethical techniques seem to be an inevitable by-product of competitive
pressures which show little sign of diminishing; 20 thus, while self-regulation
presents business men with a "fascinating challenge," 21 it does not seem
that it will prove effective in the near future.P Sophistication of the con-
sumer by education may be a long term goal-in the inevitable interim,
however, supervision of business must be explored.
In order to illustrate the problems of the defrauded purchaser, the fol-
lowing case study is presented. Although it is fictional, it represents a
typical consumer's experience.
The following advertisement appeared in Tom Conwell's local news-
paper:
15 See discussion of the Frauds Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's
Office, at pp. 434-36 infra. An assistant district attorney stated that the bureau was
set up only because no other group was helping the public.
16 See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.. 1133 (1931).
"The conscious defrauder has been, and in many courts still is, treated more
tenderly than other wrongdoers; the interests of those who have suffered at his hands
have been traditionally only grudgingly protected." Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960,
38 TEXAS L. REv. 439 (1960).
17 This was the consensus of those interviewed. See also 108 CONG. REc. 4167,
4263 (1962) (message from President Kennedy to Congress concerning consumer
interests); CALIFORNIA CoNsulmE COUNSEL REP. 3 (1962).
Is Home Furnishings Daily, July 14, 1958, p. 1, col. 2-3. This "no holds barred
contest' rationale provides the basis for a series of articles describing the selling
techniques adopted by the author (an anonymous appliance salesman in New York
City) and suggested for use by other television and appliance retailers in the area,
vho are, as the introduction to the series describes it, "ground between the millstones
of franchises on one hand and ruthless bargaining by consumers on the other. . ...
Ibid. The series, entitled A Salesnan Says, appeared consecutively in the July 14-28
issues of the Home Furnishings Daily, the newspaper of the home furnishings industry.
For a summary of this series see Confessions of an Appliance Salesman, 23 CoN-
SUMER REPORTS 546 (1958).
19 "Finance men . . . state that over the years we cleaned our house pretty well
with billions of abuses and billions of dollars at stake anyone can be damn sure that
in the meantime we are watching and correcting real abuses closer and faster than
anywhere else." Unpublished maunscript by Aaron Gold, President of Oxford
Finance Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, pp. 6-7 on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania. See generally NATIONAL BErTER BUSINESS BUREAU,
MAKING SELF-REGuLATION A REALITY, REPORT ON OPERATIONS 1964 (1964) ; Sxrrar,
SELF-REGULATION IN AcTION . . . STORY OF THE Bm'TER BUSINESS BUREAUS 1912-
1962 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SELF-REGULATION].
20 Many businessmen interviewed were willing to rationalize unethical practices
on the theory that "you can't cheat an honest man."
2 1 S UF-R uLATioN 3.
22 Senator WILLIAmS: If we wait for effective self-regulation I imagine we will
be waiting a long, long time, won't we?
Mr. HOFFMAN: [testifying for the National Better Business Bureau]: It is
conspicuous by its absence at the present time. REPORT ON FRAUDS 3.
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Unprecedented Carpet Value! 2 September Clearance Sale! 24
Nationally Advertised Broadloom Rugs. 100% Nylon 2 at 60%o
off.26  No Gimmicks. No Extras. Buy 6 areas of Wall to Wall
Carpeting for $150.27 Call Now-National Carpet Fiesta, Inc.28
594-7060.
Tom read and reread the ad. Although the family budget did not seem
to allow for the purchase of badly needed carpeting, he felt that it would
not hurt to talk to the sales representative.
The salesman told Tom about a great new promotion plan through
which Tom could earn twenty-five dollars for each person who bought
carpeting from National Carpet Fiesta after being referred by him. The
plan would enable Tom not only to pay for the carpets but also to make
additional money 2 9 The salesman advised Tom to purchase "quality"
carpets selling for the reduced price of 325 dollars rather than the "inferior"
23 The department of advertising acceptability of the New York Times has found
this phrase to be "untrue, deceptive or misleading" and therefore unacceptable. NEw
YORK TIMES, STANDARDS OF ADVERTISING ACCEPTABILITY 6 (1964). Advertisements
in other prominent newspapers, however, contain constant references to the phrases
the Times considers misleading. Thus a better business bureau recently wrote a
letter to a company advertising, "Lowest Prices in Town" requesting them to dis-
continue the advertisement. Compare NEW YORK TIMES, STANDARDS OF ADVERTISING
APPLICABILITY 6 (1964).
24 Statements announcing a "once-a-year clearance" or "bi-annual sale" are often
meaningless. Compare Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1965, p. 44 (advertisement for
June clearance sale) with Philadelphia Bulletin, June 6, 1965, p. 8 (same advertise-
ment as Inquirer advertisement, supra, except no mention of "June Clearance") and
Philadelphia Inquirer, July 18, 1965, p. 36 (same advertisement as Inquirer advertise-
ment supra, except no mention of "Clearance").
25 The fiber alone . . . is no assurance of quality. The important point
is how the fiber is used, how much of it is used, how it is built into the fabric,
and whether the carpet is well made in other respects..... "Broadloom"
only means that the product was made on a broad loom, and the best and
worst can be made on a broad loom. The 100% nylon or wool fiber is of
little value if the pile is loose or thin. There are even rugs or carpets where
the pile fiber is glued instead of being woven!
Tips on Buying Rugs and Carpeting, 44 The Shield, No. 4, Feb. 15, 1964.
26 The question is 60% of what? This is normally 60% off of a highly inflated
price. For an amusing suggestion as to the method by which prices may be set, see
Siegel, Mad's Discount Center Owner of the Year, More Trash From Mad 15-16
(1965).
27 "Never buy carpet on the basis of price alone. Question the advertisements
which offer too much for too little ... " Tips on Buying Rugs and Carpeting,
44 The Shield, No. 4, Feb. 15, 1964.
28 [M]any small and "fly by night" operators adopt a name that sounds very
impressive and resembles, perhaps, one which has a high standing and repu-
tation, often including words such as "International," "U.S." . . . or the
name of a state, which seems to give them size and stature, or suggests a
large and responsible organization.
Consumer Bull., March, 1964, p. 39.
29 Millions of dollars annually are being taken from the public by "chain referral"
schemes embodying false and fraudulent misrepresentations. U.S. POST OFFICE DEP'T,
HOW THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE PROTECTS YoU AGAINST MAIL FRAUD (1964);
see National Better Business Bureau, "Referral" Schemes (Safeguard series), on file
in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
The use of the mail in furtherance of referral schemes has been held to be illegal
under postal lottery and fraud laws, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1341 (1964) ; National Better
Business Bureau, supra; U.S. Post Office Dep't, Inspection Service Bull. No. 29, at 6
(1965). Many states have outlawed the referral schemes. U.S. PosT OFFICE DEP'T,
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150 dollar carpeting 30 Since Tom's carpets were to be used for referral
purposes, however, he could purchase them at the cost price of 250 dollars,3 '
plus a thirty dollar installation fee and five dollars for a credit check.3 2 The
salesman assured Tom that he could afford the interest charge of less than
a dollar a week.33 Since Tom's future commissions were to cover his
costs, all these terms were presented as mere formalities. When Tom
hesitated, the salesman promised that the carpeting would be installed
the next day and that he need pay nothing down, only five dollars for a
credit check and a five dollar service charge for preparing the contract.3 4
Tom signed a blank contract after the salesman told him that his secretary
would insert the details they had agreed upon. 5
After a few days Tom received a letter from a finance company which,
in part, stated:
Dear Friend:
In view of your excellent credit rating and fine character
references, the Consumer Finance Companies, Inc., have agreed
to finance your recent purchase of a carpet from the National
Carpet Fiesta, Inc. In order to better serve you we would appre-
date your answering the statements below and returning this form
to us.
How THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERvIcE PROTECTS You AGAINST MAnL FRAUD (1964).
Referral sales contracts may be voidable under state securities transactions laws against
both the retailer and the finance company. See, e.g., Ohio Consumer Frauds and
Crimes Bull. 8-102-63 (Aug. 1963), on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.2(a) (expressly permits referral schemes
under certain circumstances). For a discussion of referral in California, stating that
there is a clear state policy against such schemes, see CALIFORNIA CONSU~m COUNSEr
R,. 3 (1962).
30 The salesman never intended to sell Tom the $150 carpet His method of
introducing a consumer to a higher priced item, known as "burning," which involves
criticizing the brand the customer wants, is justified by a salesman on the ground
that "after all, it is only a question of survival." Home Furnishings Daily, July 15,
1958, p. 1, col. 2-3.
31 "[Tlhere are whole industries which sell at discount rates frequently equal to
cost only because their service charges and interest rates are so large as to provide
most profitable margins." Donolow Committee Hearings, May 15, 1963, at 11 (testi-
mony of Harry Boyer, President, Pennsylvania AFL-CIO).
32 "Installation charges are another good bit for add-ons... But there's
another add-on wrinkle I use to even up with a chiseler when all other means are
exhausted. . . . This is my credit investigation and set-up fee--the charge, a modest
$5." Home Furnishings Daily, July 25, 1958, p. 12, col. 1-2.
33 Although the interest rate may fall within legal limits, salesmen employ the
technique of stating the charge in per week or per month amounts instead of stating
the relatively higher sounding but more meaningful rate per year. Home Furnish-
ings Daily, July 22, 1958, p. 20, cols. 2-3.
34 "I'll give you this set in your house tomorrow without a penny down.
My pal makes out the order, extracts $5 or $10 towards 'sales tax' to tie him down,
and stalls delivery until he gets an O.K. from the bank." Home Furnishings Daily,
July 14, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
35 "[L]ots of guys I know still give the customer only a blank contract to sign
even though the interest rates may be standard ones." Home Furnishings Daily,
July 22, 1958, p. 20, cols. 1-2.
1966]
400 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.114:395
I understand we have signed an instrument which provides
for 36 monthly payments of $12.20 per month ....
First payment due October 1.36
Though not taking account of Tom's expected commissions, the terms were
correct, so he signed and mailed the paper to the finance company. Tom
never received a copy of his contract with National Carpet Fiesta and the
carpets were not delivered for two weeks; trouble at the factory was the
reason given for the delay. When the workmen finally installed the
carpets, Tom found that his floors had been damaged and that the carpet's
ends were frayed.
The next day Tom tried to reach the salesman but was told that he no
longer worked for the company and that another representative would call
him. Receiving no response from the company for several days, Tom took
time off from work and went to the company's office. The visit was futile
since no one could see him until the following week.
Since it would be impossible to earn referral commissions until the
carpets were repaired, Tom refused to make the first payment when it be-
came due. The finance company sent a polite note asking for payment, but
made clear that action would be taken if payment were not forthcoming.
Tom again visited National Carpet Fiesta. The company denied all respon-
sibility, claiming that the problem was due to faulty installation by the
Apex Service Company, 7 and refused to make any payment adjustments.
A telephone call to Apex produced the information that they were no
longer in business.
By this time the second payment was past due and the finance com-
pany's letters were more threatening. A third trip to the carpet company
again brought no results. When Tom went to the finance company, he
was informed that he would have to pay and could make adjustments only
with the carpet company. When Tom objected he was shown the form
he had signed and returned to the finance company. The fourth paragraph
read:
The Consumer Finance Companies, Inc., cannot accept any
responsibility for your purchase; and offers no guarantee that the
representations nade to you by the seller of the purchased item is
correct. WE ARE A FINANCING INSTITUTION ONLY. Our only
commodity is money.38
86 This is the first part of a form letter sent by an important Philadelphia finance
company to a consumer before his paper is purchased. The president of the company
calls this his "mouch letter." Note that this letter does not tell the consumer what
his total charges are. He is given only the monthly payment rate. Compare note
33 supra.
37 A salesman states that he never lets complaints bother him once the item has
left the store. Home Furnishings Daily, July 18, 1958, p. 12, cols. 1-2.
38 This is the next paragraph of the consumer letter cited note 36 supra (em-
phasis in original). At this point the company has the letter signed by the consumer
in which it denies all responsibility for the sale.
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Tom had read this before, but had not realized that he would have to pay
the finance company even if the carpets were defective. In spite of this
he refused to pay until the carpets were repaired.39
The finance company then sent another letter advising him that judg-
ment had been entered on the note he had signed. The company threatened
to levy against his household furnishings if he did not pay the entire
balance immediately. Not knowing where to find assistance, 40 Tom fol-
lowed a neighbor's suggestion and went to the better business bureau
believing that the bureau would force the company to replace the carpets.1
4
At the bureau he filled out a complaint form 42 which would be sent to
the carpet company. He also was informed that he would be notified of
the company's response.43 A few days later he learned that the company
had denied responsibility. When he asked whether he should make any
payments he found that the bureau "does not handle matters which re-
quire the services of an attorney," 44 and that he would have to engage
a lawyer to settle his disagreement. He was told that he might try the
district attorney's office and was given a pamphlet on "referral schemes." 4r
Annoyed that the bureau could not help him, he decided to write to
the chamber of commerce. The prompt reply was: "We wish to inform
you that any complaints of the above sort-are forwarded to the Better
Business Bureau. . . . We take no action at this office." 46
Deciding that he could not afford to pay an attorney he then went to
the district attorney's office. A detective heard the complaint and made a
phone call to the carpet company which again refused to make any adjust-
ment. In the detective's opinion, no criminal fraud was involved and Tom
39 "Some families capable of maintaining payments stopped paying when they
discovered that they had been cheated; but instead of gaining retribution, they were
more often subjected to legal sanctions brought upon them by the merchant." Cap-
lovitz, supra note 8, at 147. Accord, Philadelphia District Attorney James C. Crum-
lish who states that "before he knows it, there has been an execution on the note and
his house is about to be sold from uiner him ... " Donolow Committee Hearings,
May 10, 1962, at 145.
4 o In a study of consumer problems of low income families, it was found that
"when asked directly where they [low income families] would go for help if they
found themselves being cheated by a merchant, some 64 per cent said they did not
know." Caplovitz, .npra note 8, at 147.
4 1 The better business bureau, while not a law enforcement agency and hence not
very helpful for this purpose, see note 59 infra and accompanying text, "was the
agency most often cited by the minority who had some idea where they could go for
professional help." Caplovitz, supra note 8, at 147.
42A better business bureau "Customer Experience Record" is on file in Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
4 3 Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
4 4 National Better Business Bureau, Your Better Business Bureau (Safeguard
Series), on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania [hereinafter cited
as Your Better Business Bureau].
45 National Better Business Bureau, "Referral" Schemes (Safeguard Series),
on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
4GLetter From the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
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was advised to see a private attorney for advice on the civil question.
47
However, the detective told him that if he wished to prosecute he could
file a criminal complaint with a justice of the peace. If the justice of the
peace found the complaint meritorious, Tom would have to pay the costs
of issuing a private warrant. He then would have to appear before the
justice of the peace at a preliminary hearing and, if the defendant was
bound over for the grand jury, Tom again would have to appear. Finally,
if a true bill were found by the grand jury, the district attorney would
intervene as prosecutor and Tom would have to appear as a witness at
the trial.48 Since the detective had felt that no criminal fraud was involved,
and since the proceedings would require Tom to spend a great deal of time
away from work, he decided not to prosecute.
Two mornings later a deputy sheriff came to Tom's house with a
paper entitled "sheriff's levy" on which he itemized Tom's household goods
and furniture. The levy notice stated that: "All household goods and
furnishings have been levied upon by the Sheriff's Office and will remain
their [sic] property until disposed of. In the meantime they can neither
be moved or sold." 4 9
Tom's complaint to the finance company concerning the levy resulted
only in its credit manager showing him the form he signed when he pur-
chased the carpets. It provided that:
Upon maturity or in the event any monthly payment is not
paid when due, the whole unpaid balance shall forthwith, without
notice or demand, become due and payable at the option of the
holder of this note and the undersigned authorizes and empowers
any prothonotary or clerk or attorney of any court of record of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . at any time or times,
to appear for and confess judgment against the undersigned.
50
Although unable to decipher all the legal language, he realized that the
finance company could remove his furniture. Tom threatened to sue
unless he was given new carpets or the contract was torn up. The man-
ager told him, however, that the finance company was legally protected as
47 This is the practice of the Frauds Division of the Philadelphia District Attor-
ney's office, which effectively aids consumers with civil complaints in spite of its
policy that when the problem is a civil matter, "the District Attorney's Office will
advise the complainant to seek the services of a qualified attorney." The District
Attorney's Office [Philadelphia], Public News Bull. No. 2 (1964); see pp. 434-36
infra.
48 In most counties the district attorney will not initiate prosecution in small fraud
cases, but will send the complainant to start his own proceedings. Interviews With
District Attorneys.
49 A sheriff's levy which was served on a consumer who missed payments on an
installment contract is on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
GO A copy of the confession of judgment which retail installment purchasers in
Pennsylvania sign as part of the contract of sale with the dealer is on file in Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
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a "holder in due course" 51 and reminded him of the letter they had sent
him soon after the sale which informed him that it did not accept re-
sponsibility for his purchase.
Tom finally decided to see a private attorney, but the result again
was disappointing. The lawyer told him that the finance company was
protected by law and that he would have to pay them. An action against
the carpet company might gain Tom about one hundred dollars, if suc-
cessful, but even if the attorney charged the minimum bar association fees,
it would cost Tom at least that much to proceed.52 He suggested that
Tom go to the legal aid for help.0
That evening, a man came to his home, identified himself as a constable,
and presented Tom with a warrant for his arrest. The constable told Tom
that he was being arrested for fraudulent conversion and secreting prop-
erty with intent to cheat and defraud, and that he would have to come
to the Consumer Finance Company offices. At the finance company, the
constable, in the presence of a finance company representative, informed him
that he would either have to pay this debt or go to jail. He was released
after promising to pay early the following week.
54
Tom then contacted the legal aid society in a final attempt to gain
protection. When he arrived, he filled out a form requiring information
about himself and his family assets. He was then informed that he could
not be represented by legal aid. His income was in excess of the maximum
allowed, and therefore he did not qualify as a poor person. 55
The result of Tom's experience was a bill of 450 dollars owed to the
finance company, six areas of frayed and faded carpets, and a realization
that "nobody is doing anything to help the consumer." 56
51 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-302, 3-304, 3-305. See also discussion at
pp. 414-18 infra.
52 The minimum fee schedule adopted by the Philadelphia Bar Association, De-
cember 29, 1964, indicates minimum civil practice fees of $25 an hour for preparing
a brief, $50 for attending a pretrial conference, and $200 for each day in court.
53 Every lawyer interviewed held the view expressed by Pennsylvania State
Senator Rowland B. Mahany that most lawyers in this instance would send the client
home.
54 A recent report states that although "it is a fundamental principle of law that
a criminal prosecution may not be used to collect a civil debt," such practice is not
uncommon in Philadelphia. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE MAGISTERIAL SYSTEM 439-49 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MAGISTRATES
REPORT].
55 Legal aid counsel in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Camden, New Jersey, indi-
cated that their staffs were too small to handle cases where a man had enough income
to hire a lawyer even if no lawyer would accept his case. Robert D. Abrahams, Esq.,
legal counsel for the Philadelphia Legal Aid Society, contends that his branch will
represent a consumer in this situation if he can find no lawyer to take his case. See
also pp. 409-10 infra.
56 This was also the answer given by a prominent Philadelphia attorney when
explaining why he accepted the position of consumer counsel with a state committee
in Harrisburg investigating credit practices. His motive for accepting the position
was not an altruistic desire to aid his follow man but a realization that while the
banking or finance company counsel would be besieged by groups and other attorneys
pressuring him to support their position, no one would bother him as consumer
counsel and "I could spend more time here in Philadelphia with my wife and kids."
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II. NONGOVERNMENTAL PROTECTION
A. The Better Business Bureau
"When [consumers were] asked directly where they would go for help
if . . . cheated by a merchant . . . . the Better Business Bureau
was the agency most often cited by the minority who had some idea
where they could go for professional help." 57 Tom's neighbors imagine
that the bureau is an organization that gives recommendations and en-
dorsements, passes judgment on the quality of merchandise, and recovers
money from unscrupulous businessmen; 58 they are, however, misin-
formed. 59 While the better business bureau does aid the public, its effec-
tiveness lies somewhere between this widely held image and the conception
of some attorneys that "unfortunately, the Better Business Bureau doesn't
do a thing to help people." 60
Unlike consumer protection organizations whose funds are provided
by government or by consumers, "the Better Business Bureau is . . .
an independent agency of Business, organized as a non-profit corporation
which is financed entirely by membership dues or subscriptions voluntarily
paid to it by responsible business and professional firms." 61
The bureau's program includes direct contact with the public.6 2 In
large part, this consists of answering inquiries from consumers concerning
the reliability of firms with which they plan to do business.6 3 Had Tom
called before dealing with the carpet company, however, as the bureau
recommends, 64 he would have been refused any information over the tele-
phone and would have received only a letter stating the number of com-
plaints registered against the company during the last three years and the
number the company answered.65 Further questioning of the bureau
would have been unproductive, since the bureau does not disclose the con-
57 Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 143, 147 (1965)
(study of consumer problems of New York low income families).
58 See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
59 Your Better Business Bureau.
60 Interview With Member of Philadelphia's "Neighborhood Law Office" Pro-
gram. This feeling was echoed by a number of other attorneys interviewed.
61 Your Better Business Bureau.
62 The Bureau was founded in 1912 by a group of businessmen as a "vigilance
committee" to eliminate abuses and create codes and standards in the field of adver-
tising. SELF-REGuLATION 8. By emphasizing to the public that "the poor ethics of
the few did not represent the policies and practices of all advertisers," ibid., these
executives hoped to restore public confidence in their profession. Id. at 17, 18.
63 More than two million inquiries were made by businessmen and consumers
in 1962. Your Better Business Bureau. Seventy-two percent of the nearly three
million "instances of service" reported by 104 better business bureaus in 1964 were
inquiries. BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, STATISTICS FOR 1964, Table I (1965).
64 Your Better Business Bureau.
65 In order to gain first hand knowledge of bureau procedure, an editor of the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review telephoned to inquire about the reliability
of a particular carpet company whose advertisement had appeared in three Philadel-
phia daily newspapers. The report he received containing the above information, as
well as a statement that "this bureau does not make recommendations nor give advice,"
is on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
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tent of complaints nor does it state whether the company has taken any
action to rectify them.6 6 The ineffectiveness of this method has been noted
by the bureau.
[A] flat "yes" or "no" answer to a call about whether we've
"had any complaints against the XYZ Company" would really tell
the inquirer nothing. . . . The kind of complaints would be im-
portant. . . . Our report must give the whole picture. In other
words, it isn't how many but what kind of complaints and the
degree of responsibility shown by the company in making an hon-
est effort to eliminate the causes of dissatisfaction, that counts.
6 7
In many cases the consumer will not contact the bureau until the
seller refuses to adjust his complaint. Although the bureau is effective in
resolving consumer complaints arising from "unfortunate misunderstand-
ings," 68 it can do little in situations like Tom's where the company denies
all responsibility. The bureau's limitations are illustrated by a leading
consumer magazine's account of a buyer who had not received merchan-
dise previously paid for:
[O]ur subscriber wrote the Better Business Bureau which in
turn wrote twice to the company in question, but received no
reply. The bureau noted that: "Unfortunately the Better Busi-
ness Bureau cannot compel addressees to answer its communi-
cations." 69
Another aspect of the bureau's consumer protection program is the
establishment of advertising standards in nearly every sales area. The
bureau holds conferences with individual industry groups and administers
voluntary advertising codes.70 A looseleaf service providing detailed
standards in more than fifty different product and service categories is
also published. 71 A committee on each newspaper in screening potentially
66 Upon receipt of the better business bureau report, note 65 mipra and accom-
panying text, the editor made a second telephone call. After insisting that the in-
formation he had received could not be helpful to him, he was transferred to the
"rug expert," who informed him that the information given could not be supplemented
and that he should use his own intelligence in deciding whether to deal with the
company.
67 "Complaints" Alone Don't Tell the Story, 44 The Shield, No. 18, Sept. 15,
1964.
68 SELF-REGuiLATioN 18. The bureau estimates this type of complaint accounts
for "perhaps half of all consumer problems." Ibid.
69 Editor's note to "Don't Be Gypped by Mail-Order Firms," Consumer Bull.
March-April, 1964, p. 1.
70 SELF-REGuLATIoN 12-13.
71 A Guide for Retail Advertising and Selling (Association of Better Business
Bureaus, Inc.) advertisement on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsyl-
vania; see 45 The Shield, No. 10, May 15, 1965. The National Better Business
Bureau also publishes a looseleaf service, "Do's and Don't's in Advertising Copy,"
see NATIONAL BETRn BUSINESS BUREAU, REPORT ON OPERATIONS (1964).
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fraudulent copy 72 draws suggestions from bureau standards and occa-
tionally checks directly with the bureau before running particular adver-
tisements.73  Indeed, one Philadelphia newspaper submits "all carpet ad-
vertising . . . before publication." 74 This newspaper, however, does
not relinquish its right to make the final judgment. As the paper's retail
advertising manager wrote in a memorandum explaining this policy to his
staff, "we are guided only by them [better business bureau personnel], and
then determine our own policy . . . . This goes for all types of advertis-
ing . . ..
As Tom discovered when he read his daily newspaper, advertisements
objectionable on their face are still printed 76 despite the setting of stand-
ards and the establishment of committees. Misleading copy is submitted
by an advertising representative who "doesn't worry himself about what's
in the ad [since] he only wants his commission." 77 It then may be pub-
lished because of management's conviction that "a newspaper's not a
censor" and cannot "suggest how people should write copy." 78 If the
bureau's daily local newspaper check reveals such misleading copy, a letter 79
or an "advertising double check" form is sent to the company running the
ad. These communications are not sent to "criticize the advertisers, but
merely . . [to ask] them to recheck and reevaluate their copy when
making the same or similar copy usage in the future." SO Even though co-
operation is secured from the advertiser in a great majority of cases, it is
"sometimes only after weeks of persuasion and patient negotiation" s8
during which time the harmful advertising appears before the public every
day. The bureau will only contact the newspaper that publishes the ad
if the company continually refuses to honor bureau requests to have the
72 Interviews With Retail Advertising Managers. The Advertising Acceptability
Department of the New York Times declined 18,000 lines of advertising copy in 1962.
Address by Vincent Redding, Manager, Advertising Acceptability Department, The
New York Times, Sales Conference of Newspaper Advertising Executives Associ-
ation, July 12-15, 1964. The rejected copy was found either to be misleading, to make
unfair competitive statements, or to fail to comply with Times standards of decency
and dignity. See NEW YORK TIMES, STANDARDS OF ADvERTISING AccEPTABILITY 2
(1964). See generally id. at 4-7.
3 SELF-REGULATION 15; NATIONAL BTTER BusINEss BUREAu, REPORT ON Op-
ERATIONS (1964).
74 Interoffice memorandum from the retail advertising manager of the Philadel-
phia Evening Bulletin to his staff, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Penn-
sylvania.
75 Ibid.
76 See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
77 Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
78 Interview With Newspaper Retail Advertising Manager.
79 An advertisement offering the "lowest prices in town" led the bureau to send
the company a letter, informing it that its advertisement conflicted with bureau
standards. Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
80 43 The Shield, No. 11, June 1, 1963.
81NATioNAL BETTER BUSINESS BuREAu, REPORT ON OPERATIONS (1964). In
the National Better Business Bureau's investigation of national advertising, coopera-
tion was secured from the advertisers and their agencies in more than 947o of the
cses where the advertising was adjudged to be misleading. Ibid.
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objectionable material removed.8 2 The newspaper is also not criticized,
but is requested to discontinue the advertisement which could not have
been printed had bureau standards been followed.
s3
Furthermore misleading advertising practices sometimes are so wide-
spread that the bureau does not even attempt to halt the practice. Grossly
exaggerated claims of potential earnings, s4 representations of substantial
savings on items actually sold at retail prices,8 5 "special" sales that run
continually, 6 and low prices offered without suggestion of the limited
quantity of the merchandise that can be obtained at that price 8 7 are pub-
lished constantly in newspapers and are defended as "trader's talk" or
"puffing." 88
Even newspapers with the most effective procedures for screening
advertisements that are false or misleading on their face may be subject
to criticism, since in many cases they accept copy without making any
attempt to ascertain if the advertiser is in a position to supply the products
or services promised. The New York Times, for example, was criticized
by a consumer testing magazine for advertising a microscope with magni-
fication of 1200 times for seventeen dollars and fifty cents, when even a
cursory investigation would have revealed that well known microscope
makers could only offer such high magnification with instruments priced
in the range of four to five hundred dollars or more.89
82 Interview With Better Business Bureau Official. Another alternative open
to the Bureau is to have the case
subjected to the pitiless glare of publicity. Sometimes this may be done in
the Bureau's bulletin which is widely circulated to business executives and to
employees. Or it may be made available to printed and broadcast media.
. . . [A]s a last resort information concerning the offender's activities may
be brought to the attention of the proper city, state, or federal law enforce-
ment agency ...
Your Better Business Bureau.
83 Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
84E.g., Philadelphia- Daily News, June 7, 1965, p. 50, cols. 3-4 (you can earn
$500.00 a week as a professional dog trainer). But see NEw YORK TIMES, STANDARDS
OF ADVERTISING AccEPTAmnLITY 5 (1964) (no ads will be accepted for salesmen stating
that specific income will be achieved within a given period of time).
85 See 45 The Shield, No. 4, Feb. 15, 1965 (warning that offers of beef at ex-
tremely low prices per pound refer to undressed portions, and when the beef is trimmed
into usable cuts, the price per pound is boosted to ordinary retail price).80 "Clearance in August, Clearance in October, Once a Year Sale in November,
Sale Every Month." Interview With Better Business Bureau Official; see note 24
supra.
87 Compare Philadelphia Inquirer, June 6, 1965, p. 8 (TV section) (carpet ad-
vertisement in which no mention is made of square footage of carpeting offered for
price stated), with Inter-office newspaper advertising manager memo, supra note 74
(newspaper adopts better business bureau standard of placing footage available for
price on all carpet advertisements).
58 "It would only be 'puffing' if we ran an ad telling people they could make up
to $100,000 a year working for our paper. I don't make that much, but some of the
men working in the front office must. So you can 'make' that much. No one would
believe that everyone does." Interview With Newspaper Advertising Manager.
89 Consumer Bull. April, 1962, p. 2. It has been remarked that the New York
Times "features all the news that's fit to print, but has no corresponding slogan on
the quality of its advertising." Ibid.
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While newspapers refuse to accept any copy in certain fields particu-
larly fraught with the likelihood that the offered item is not available9 0
and will carefully investigate the underlying offer in a few additional ques-
tionable classifications,91 most advertisements are printed without a pre-
ventive check into the company's ability or desire to stand behind its
advertisement. 92 The policy of many newspapers is to publish any adver-
tisement submitted by a company whose name is well known, unless the
copy violates newspaper standards by being fraudulent on its face.93 In
defense of this policy, newspapers argue that "we aren't set up to protect
people from buying poor quality merchandise." The publication of many
fraudulent advertisements is also rationalized by assuming that the public is
sufficiently sophisticated to recognize fraudulent schemes. This is indi-
cated by the remarks of a newspaper advertising manager that, "we run
many used car ads, for example, without checking deals. Everyone knows
used car dealers are not the epitome of honesty."
While the newspaper can not be expected to make an exhaustive in-
vestigation of every advertiser, it should certainly check whenever it has
a reasonable suspicion that the dealer is not offering what he advertises.
In many cases, this suspicion should be aroused by the nature of the adver-
tisement itself, such as a price so low that it is unlikely that a satisfactory
product could be sold for that figure.
Unfortunately when the newspaper does call upon a better business
bureau for information about a prospective advertiser, the bureau will
disclose, as in the case of consumer inquiries, only the number of con-
sumer complaints registered and the number the company has answered. 5
The bureau refuses to discuss with the newspaper the type of complaints
or the nature of the firm's responses since "that would take all day." 96
In situations involving both advertising and selling abuses, action by
appropriate local, state or federal authorities will be requested by the bureau
only after all attempts to secure voluntary compliance have been unsuccess-
90 Philadelphia newspapers, for example, will not run advertisements for vending
machine schemes. Interview With Better Business Bureau Official. The New York
Times will not print advertisements soliciting investments in nonproducing mining
or oil property, or in oil royalties. NEw YORK TIMES, STANDARDS OF ADVETISING
ACCEPTABILITY 4 (1964).
91 One Philadelphia newspaper indicated that it makes each investment or fran-
chise dealer who wishes to advertise fill out a detailed four page form stating the
type of contract potential investors must sign and the type of inventory securing
their investment. The New York Times also requires certain advertisers to fill out
questionnaires. NEw YORK TIMES, STANDARDS OF ADVERTISING ACCEPTABIITY 3
(1964).
92 One of the results of such a policy is that "cheats and swindlers masquerading
as mail-order dealers . . . have had no difficulty getting their advertising . . . into
newspapers . . . ." Editor's note to "Don't Be Gypped by Mail-Order Firms,"
Consumer Bull., March-April, 1964, pp. 1, 4.
93 Interview With Newspaper Advertising Manager.
94 See 44 The Shield, No. 5, March 1, 1964 (automobile advertised for "only
$49" lacked engine).
95 See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text
96Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
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ful.97 Unfortunately, government authorities are not always in a position
to operate effectively because the better business bureaus, in the name of
voluntary self-regulation, have opposed and helped defeat consumer pro-
tection legislation.
98
B. Private Attorneys
Although most attorneys are sympathetic to the problems that face
consumers like Tom, they feel that financial considerations make it imprac-
tical to help such individuals.99 As one New Jersey lawyer explained:
The sad thing is that these people that get cheated often have the
legal right to get a judgment against the company. The problem
is how to enforce these rights. Since in New Jersey the paper-
work for a $150 claim is the same as for a $10,000 claim I just
have to turn people down who have lost small amounts.
In many instances fraudulent operators carefully avoid cheating individuals
out of large sums of money because they realize that "no one bilked out of
fifty dollars is going to pay a lawyer to get his money back." Thus the
only cases lawyers are willing to handle are those brought either by the
unusual individual who will pay more than the amount of his claim in order
to see justice done, or by those defrauded out of amounts large enough to
justify the expenditure for legal fees. The number of consumers having
no redress because the amount lost is not commensurate with the attorney's
fee constitutes the vast majority.100
C. Legal Aid Societies
The help provided the poor by the legal aid societies has led many to
make the statement that "in some cases consumers who have been gypped
are better off if they are very poor." Legal aid can afford to represent
plaintiffs in cases involving small amounts because, unlike the private at-
torney, it does not have to make money. Unfortunately however, the
societies are often hampered by pathetically small staffs 10 1 and inadequate
9 7 SELF-REGuLAION 18.
98 Kenneth B. Willson, President of the National Better Business Bureau, Inc.,
stated at Governor Harriman's statewide conference on consumer problems that
"the so-called white lie of the dishonest price comparison has reached scandalous
proportions and now threatens the believability of all advertising." However, he
maintained that businessmen could solve the problem without new legislation. New
York World Telegram & Sun, Oct. 3, 1957, p. 10. See also Donolow Committee
Hearings, June 13, 1962, at 591, 605 (testimony of Kenneth Orr, representative
of the Pittsburgh Better Business Bureau, opposing any change in consumer credit
statutes including the proposal for licensing salesmen). But see Donolow Committee
Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 46 (testimony of William D. Henderson, Trade Practice
Consultant of the Philadelphia Better Business Bureau).
99 See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
100 Consensus of Interviews.
101The Camden County, New Jersey, Legal Aid Society, for example, consists
of two part time attorneys, one a recent law school graduate. In Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, the Society has eight attorneys, but it must also assume the functions of a
defender association so that four of these attorneys work only on criminal matters.
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budgets 102 which severely limit their community service potential. In
order to effectively utilize limited resources, the Philadelphia Legal Aid
Society generally investigates any group or individual against whom three
or more complaints are filed. This program has the merit of halting fraud-
ulent practices before they become widespread and engender additional
complaints. 0 3
Strong opposition voiced by the organized bar in a few cities to many
facets of the legal aid activities has hampered the societies' effectiveness by
instilling a fear of being "in competition with private counsel." 104 This has
led to the rule that "the Legal Aid Society will not knowingly accept any
case for service where the client can pay a fee . . ." 105 and this rule has
been implemented by the setting of strict maximum income levels for
representation. 0 6  This policy has been criticized as unfair because it
denies representation to all those defrauded consumers like Tom whose
income level is above the maximum set but who are unable to hire an
attorney since his fees would be higher than the amount they seek to re-
cover.10 7 Philadelphia's Legal Aid Society remedies this situation in some
cases by waiving its maximum income standards in order to represent
persons so situated. 108
The influx of federal funds to cities participating in anti-poverty pro-
grams may help to solve some of the problems of legal representation for
the poor. Thus a committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association has sug-
gested a plan whereby a consumer advocate will serve as an arm of the
poverty program, arguing test cases, protecting the public against fraud,
and endeavoring to correct problems through legislation or administrative
process. 1 9 Such a specific program must be adopted in order to insure
that the problem of consumer fraud will not be brushed aside by the mass
of other duties which any counsel appointed to aid the poor must perform.
III. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROTECTION
A. Retail Sales Legislation
The kind of practices to which Tom Conwell fell victim were inten-
sified by the tremendous expansion of consumer credit from 1945 to 1965.
In this period consumer debt expanded twelve fold reaching its present
102 Consensus of Interviews With Legal Aid Attorneys.
103 Interview With Robert D. Abrahams, Chief Counsel. Abrahams keeps a
bulging scrapbook of clippings attesting to the success of this policy.
104 1962 PITTSBURGH LEGAL Am SocIErY ANN. REP.
105 1963 PITTSBURGi LEGAL Am Socrry ANN. REP.
106 For example, a married man without children will not be represented by
the Pittsburgh Legal Aid Society if his annual income is greater than $3,000. Inter-
view With Pittsburgh Legal Aid Society Personnel.
107 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
108 Interview With Attorneys for Philadelphia Legal Aid Society.
109 Interview With Robert D. Abrahams, Chief Counsel, Legal Aid Society of
Philadelphia. Philadelphia's Legal Aid Society, Bar Association, and Anti-Poverty
Action Committee will jointly sponsor this effort when final plans are adopted.
Abrahams stated that funds should be available to provide the consumer advocate
with an investigatory and secretarial staff.
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eighty billion dollar level while disposable income only tripled.110 The
commercial banks and finance companies-the primary lenders 1 11-set the
stage for defrauding credit buyers like Tom by purchasing commercial
paper from dealers whose techniques include:
high finance charges; excessive service charges; investigation fees
and so-called settlement fees; . . . misrepresentation with re-
spect to the underlying goods or services; and failure of the seller-
lender to disclose fully the terms and conditions of the contract
before the buyer's signature is affixed.11
When the consumer sought legal protection, he was informed that
"our present laws are limited in scope and applicability. They were not
designed for-nor do they apply to--the present and new types of con-
sumer credit transactions." 113 Pennsylvania, for example, found that the
only statute of general applicability dealing with interest rates 114 was its
usury statute of 1858,115 which did not cover finance charges added as
part of the sales price.116 To fill this gap, interested legislators in many
states have introduced bills to regulate credit transactions either in all
selling fields 117 or in areas peculiarly associated with abuse, such as auto-
mobile sales.118 The threat of governmental regulation,1 9 however, brought
together powerful business groups which fought any legislation that might
interfere with their activities.120  This lobby claimed that installment sell-
110 Address by Colston E. Warne, Tenth Annual AFL-CIO National Conference
on Community Services, May 20, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
III Commercial banks are the largest holders of consumer paper, accounting for
about 40% of the total, with sales finance companies holding less than half as much
as the banks. Ibid.
112 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 102 (statement of William
M. Steinbeck, Deputy Secretary of Banking).
113 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 15, 1963, at 20 (statement of Walter
Alessandroni, Attorney General of Pennsylvania).
114 See Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 19 (testimony of David
Stahl, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, describing absence of Pennsylvania legis-
lation).
115 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 1-5 (1954).
116 See Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 449, 21 A.2d 55,
58 (1941); Personal Discount Co. v. Lincoln Tire Co., 67 Pa. D. & C. 35, 39 (C.P.
Philadelphia County 1949).
117 See Note, Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 854, 856
(1958). See generally Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation,
44 ComL L.Q. 38 (1958).
118 See Note, 58 Cormi. L. REv. 854, 856 (1958).
119 "People don't like to be subjected to governmental regulation and we don't
like being blamed for regulation." Address by Anthony G. Felix, Jr., Esq., 1963
Lending Conference, Pennsylvania Bankers Association, November 21, 1963 [here-
inafter cited as Pennsylvania Bankers Association Address]. In this address, Mr.
Felix, who is Senior Vice President and Secretary of the First Pennsylvania Banking
and Trust Company, explained to the Bankers Association why one of its committees
had drafted the Pennsylvania Home Improvement Finance Act.
120 Cf. New York World Telegram & Sun, Oct. 3, 1957, p. 10 (opposition to
proposed advertising laws from Chamber of Commerce, State Council of Retail Mer-
chants, Better Business Bureau and National Retail Jewelers Association).
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ing would be depressed, and the unscrupulous would circumvent the new
laws, leaving the onus of regulation on responsible businessmen.
1 2 1
The strength of this opposition is demonstrated by the problems which
the proponents of consumer protection legislation have encountered in
Pennsylvania. In the late 1940's, when credit sales of automobiles were
still in their infancy and opposition to consumer credit legislation had not
as yet crystallized,12 2 the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Motor Ve-
hicle Sales Finance Act 123 which denied "holder in due course" protection
to holders of automobile paper. 2 4 The act not only required installment
sellers and finance companies 125 to be licensed but also set down require-
ments for the content of contracts.
126
In 1962 the Pennsylvania Senate Banking Committee held hearings on
consumer credit practices, which emphasized the need for similar legislation
covering all types of retail installment sales.'2 7 When passage of either the
senate "all goods" bill produced by these hearings ms or house home im-
provement legislation' 29 became "not only inevitable but imminent," 130
the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association decided to change its tactic of
"quiet opposition" 131 to bills that were "for some reason not entirely satis-
factory to banks." 132 Although it realized that the need for "all-goods"
legislation was unmistakable,' s3 the Pennsylvania Bankers Association
drafted a bill providing safeguards only for installment purchases of home
improvements. This bill was substituted for the pending legislation and
was passed.'2 4
The resulting statute, the Home Improvement Finance Act,13 5 not
only fails to meet the admitted need for protection in all retail sales but
also leaves consumers like Tom completely unprotected. The act does not
specify what constitutes a "home improvement" except for the statement
121 Interviews With Bank and Finance Company Officials; see Hogan, supra
note 117, at 73.
122 "If the bill came up today, we would oppose some of its major provisions
vigorously and I'm certain it wouldn't pass." Interview With Bank Counsel.
123 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (Supp. 1964).
124 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615(g) (Supp. 1964).
125 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 604 (Supp. 1964).
126 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 69, §§ 614-15 (Supp. 1964).
127 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, May 25, 1962, June 13, 1962.
After these hearings ended, Senator Benjamin H. Donolow, Chairman of the Com-
mittee, introduced a bill, Pa. S. 580, Sess. of 1963, and an additional hearing was
held on May 15, 1963, to enable interested parties to express their opinions on the
proposed legislation.
128 Pa. S. 580, Sess. of 1963.
12 Pa. H. 120, Sess. of 1963.
130 Pennsylvania Bankers Association Address 2.
131 Consensus of Interviews With a Pennsylvania State Senator, Counsel to
Senate Investigating Committee on Consumer Credit, and Deputy Attorney General.
132 Pennsylvania Bankers Association Address 2.
133 Ibid.
134 Home Improvement Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101 to -602
(Supp. 1964).
15 Ibid.
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that it does not cover "an appliance designed to be free-standing and not
built into and permanently affixed as an integral part of the structure." 136
Even if carpeting bought in large quantities and specifically made for areas
in a home could be classified as a home improvement, 137 Tom would re-
main unprotected since his purchase falls below the act's 300 dollar mini-
mum.138 The ineffectiveness of this legislative effort should not have been
unexpected, however, since, as one commentator has stated, "the result
[of following financial interests' advice] is from the consumer's point of
view rather like what might emerge if a committee of dogs were employed
to draft a protective ordinance for cats." 139
An all-goods act substantially the same as that proposed two years
before was introduced in the 1965 legislative session.140 The proposed act's
chance of passage was adequately assessed by counsel for the 1962 hearings
when he said: "I didn't even pick up a copy of this bill since I know it
won't pass." Even the chairman of the committee to which the bill was
referred is refusing to hold hearings because of the great opposition to the
bill by business interests in his district.' 4'
The chief impediment to passage of such legislation is familiar. It
appears that although banks "will tell you they are in favor of legislation
to protect the consumers, when the time comes, they have the votes to de-
feat it." 142 Financial interests also are criticized because they merely
reject bills in their entirety rather than discuss specific provisions that they
oppose.143
The opposition to all-goods legislation manifested in Pennsylvania
has been overcome in many states. By 1965 twenty-eight states had suc-
ceeded in enacting such legislation. 1' However, the statutes passed are
136 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-102(10) (Supp. 1964).
137 Suggestion of Deputy Attorney General. A Pennsylvania state senator, how-
ever, predicted that courts would not interpret the act as covering carpeting.
138 PA. STAT. AlNN. tit. 73, § 500-102(11) (Supp. 1964).
139 Gilmore, American Chattel Security Devices, 2 Bus. L. Rxv. 65, 70 (1955).
140 Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965.
141 Interview With Pennsylvania State Senator Rowland B. Mahany, Chairman
of the Senate Banking Committee. The act has succeeded in passing the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives, but only after it had been amended 102 times. Philadel-
phia Evening Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1965, p. 25, col. 1. The senate adjourned without
passing the bill.
142 Interview With Deputy Attorney General. This view was echoed in many
other interviews including those with legal aid and finance company counsel.
143 Interview With Pennsylvania State Senator.
144The following statutes covering all goods have been enacted: ALAsr A STAT.
§§45.10.010-.230 (Supp. 1962); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.9; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 121-2-1 to -10 (1962) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 42-83 to -100 (1962) ; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4301-50 (Supp. 1964) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 520.30-.42 (1962) ; HAWAII
REv. LAws §§ 201A-1 to -33 (Supp. 1963) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-806 (Supp. 1965) ;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1213/, §§ 223-53 (Smith-Hurd 1960) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-901
to -945 (1961); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-501 to -514 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 371.210-.990 (1963) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 128-53 (1957) ; MAss. GEN.
LAWs ANN. ch. 255, §§ 11-13H (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 408.250-.370 (Supp.
1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 74-601 to -612 (1962); Neb. Laws 1965, L.B.
No. 283; Nev. Laws 1965, A.B. No. 440; NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-1 to -61 (1963) ;
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characterized by wide differences in coverage 145 and content; 14 6 few are
extensive enough to provide full protection for the consumer. A number
of specific provisions must be included in any such legislation if it is to
perform its function adequately. The types of provisions necessary are
the subject of the following discussion.
1. Holder in Due Course
The factor singled out by the great majority of those interviewed for
this study as the largest problem in the consumer fraud area-"the mask
behind which fraud hides" 147-is the ability of financial agencies, absent
regulation in retail sales acts, to purchase installment contracts free from
responsibility for fraudulent practices perpetrated by dealers. Once Tom's
note was in the hands of the finance company,148 he was required to pay
for his carpets, although they were defective and the company would not
repair them. He similarly would be obliged to pay if the carpet company
had gone out of business after defrauding him or had no corporate assets
and was therefore judgment proof.
The Uniform Commercial Code protects a financial institution that
buys negotiable consumer paper as a holder in due course,149 unless the
consumer can prove: (1) that the holder had notice that . . . [the in-
N.M. LAWS 1965, ch. 258; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§401-19; N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 51-13-01 to 108 (1960) ; OHIO Rzv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.01-.99 (Page 1962) ; ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 83.010-.190 (Supp. 1963); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-11-101 to -110
(1964) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-2a (1962) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2401-09 (Supp.
1963); WASH. Ray. CODE ANN. §§ 63.14.010-.920 (Supp. 1964).
Twenty-six automobile finance acts have been enacted: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-281 to -295 (Supp. 1964); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-84.3; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-16-1 to -10 (1953) ; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-901 to -910 (1961) ; DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, §§ 2901-11 (Supp. 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 520.01-.13 (1962) ; IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 322.1-.16 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 190.090-.990 (1963); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6:951-64 (Supp. 1964); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. ch. 321, § 3401 to ch.
327, § 3523 (1964) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255B, §§ 1-24 (Supp. 1964) ; MIcH.
Comp. LAWS §§ 492.101-.140 (Supp. 1961) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 168.66-.77 (1960) ;
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 8075-01 to -24 (Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 365.010-.160
(Supp. 1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§361-A:1-:12 (Supp. 1963); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§50-15-1 to -12 (1962); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§301-12; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20-285 to -308 (Supp. 1963); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 83.510-.990 (Supp. 1963); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (Supp. 1964) ; S.D. CODE §§ 6.04C01-15 (Supp. 1960) ;
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5074a (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2351-61
(Supp. 1963) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-545 to -550 (1958) ; Wis. STAT. § 218.01 (1963).
New Jersey and Pennsylvania have home finance acts: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-
63 to -94 (1963) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101 to -602 (Supp. 1964).
For a detailed analysis of the provisions of each of these statutes see generally
CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965); CCH INSTALLMENT
CREDIT GUIDE.
145 See Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 854, 862-64 (1958).
146 See id. at 866-85.
147 Interview With New Jersey Municipal Judge.
148 The process by which the finance company acquired Tom's note is described
in Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective Goods, 102 U.
PA. L. REv. 782, 783 (1952).
149 UNIFORM COmMERcIAL CODE §§ 3-302, 3-305; see UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW §§ 52, 57.
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strument] is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or
claim to it on the part of any person"; 150 or (2) that the consumer signed
the note under such misrepresentation that he had "neither knowledge nor
reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essen-
tial terms." 151
Every financing agency interviewed claimed that it conducted a de-
tailed check of each dealer before purchasing his consumer paper and also
spot checked customers to ascertain if they were receiving the products or
services for which they had contracted.152 Each admitted, however, that
many other agencies were taking advantage of the difficulty of proving
dealer fraud by purchasing consumer paper either with actual knowledge
of an underlying fraudulent sale or under conditions where reasonable in-
quiry would apprise them of this fact.153  Realizing that it is almost
impossible for a defrauded consumer to prove that a financial institution
had actual notice of his transaction with the dealer, courts have recently
been withdrawing the holder in due course protection from financial insti-
tutions which "should have known" the underlying transaction was fraud-
ulent. Some courts have thus placed responsibility on financial agencies
that become completely intertwined with the dealer whose paper they
purchase. For example, in Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers,'14 the court held
that a finance company "became so inextricably a part of the original
transaction with the purchaser that it could not thereafter stand aloof in
the role of a holder in due course in good faith" 1.5 when it had knowledge
of the general difficulties existing in food freezer sales, required the dealer
to use forms it prepared, and insisted that the resulting notes could only
be negotiated to the finance company.
Courts are also restricting holder in due course protection in areas
where banks and finance companies are adopting a "see no evil" stance.
Often in these cases discount rates are marked down significantly, and a
dealer might receive only fifty percent for his paper. "The suspicion must
be in such cases either that the vending company has no intention of fur-
nishing what it has promised the consumer, or has vastly overpriced the
item sold." 15 Thus, in Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 157 the court
150 UNIFORM COMCIAL. CODE §3-305(1) (c); see UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRJUMENTS LAW § 52(2).
151 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(2) (c); see UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW § 55.
152 Spot checking is not always effective, since some salesmen may tell the pur-
chaser that in order to facilitate a better credit arrangement, the salesmen must tell
the finance company that an unfinished job has been completed to the purchaser's
satisfaction. Interview With Finance Company Officials.
153 As stated by a bank official, they are "financing where they have no right
being."
154 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. 1962).
155 Id. at 591, 181 A.2d -at 818.
156Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 42 (testimony of Robert
D. Abrahams, Chief Counsel, Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia).
157 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
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held that a finance company which discounted a 1,079 dollar note due in
three days for $831, with knowledge that the sale was on a referral basis
and that the dealer had changed its name three times during the pre-
ceeding year, "was bound to inquire further into the operation of the
seller of these notes, and having made no inquiry, it is held as though it
had knowledge of all that inquiry would have revealed." 151 The effective-
ness of cases limiting the holder in due course defense is dulled by ignorance
of the law on the part of attorneys. An attorney for a large finance com-
pany stated that he used the holder in due course doctrine
to scare away lawyers. Every time they have a claim against you,
you tell them that they'll have to sue the dealer since you are pro-
tected as a holder in due course. Lawyers generally don't even
know that the protection was taken away by the Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act, and you can count the ones that know about the
Norman case on your fingers.
On the other hand, action by knowledgeable attorneys has not led to
decisions clarifying the restrictions of the doctrine, but has only engen-
dered private settlements with banks and finance companies. A finance
company attorney remarked that "to say that banks and finance companies
will bend over backwards to settle claims rather than go to court is an
understatement." Banking counsel charged that courts are straining the
law to hold against banks and finance companies and agreed that "the time
is definitely not ripe for any more test cases on the scope of the [holder in
due course] doctrine."
While cases narrowing the scope of the holder in due course protec-
tion do provide some aid to the innocent consumer, these decisions leave
unaltered the practices creating the need for defenses against the financial
institution, conditions which will be corrected only by consumer protection
legislation. 59 Some state retail sales acts completely remove consumer
installment notes from the area of negotiability and forbid clauses whereby
the consumer waives all defenses against a holder for value of the note. 6 0
A compromise between this step and complete noninterference with the
holder in due course doctrine has been adopted by other states, which allow
the consumer a short period of time to complain to the finance company
about the underlying transaction, after which time the financial institution
assumes holder in due course protection."' Under this statutory provision,
which is included in Pennsylvania's Home Improvement Finance Act 16 2
15
8 d. at 59, 195 A.2d at 118. For additional cases and discussion see Hogan,
supra note 117, at 66 n.147; Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 782, 789-91 (1952).
159Id. at 790-91.
160 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art 83, § 147 (1957) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
255, § 12C (Supp. 1964).
161 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2 (fifteen days' notice); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1964) (fifteen days' notice) ; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 403(1)-3 (a)
(ten days' notice).
162 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-208 (Supp. 1964) (fifteen days' notice).
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and the proposed "all-goods" act,' Tom would have received a form from
the finance company stating in large capital letters that he should notify
the finance company within ten days, (fifteen days in some statutes 164) if
the accompanying written statement of his contract with the carpet com-
pany was not "correct in every respect" or "if the goods or services . . .
have not already been delivered or performed as you agreed to." 165 Even
though the consumer is given this period to complain before the finance
company is able to shut the "holder in due course" door on him, the finance
companies have not objected to this system. The reason, as stated by one
of their attorneys, is:
The courts have been looking for ways to take the holder in due
course protection away from finance companies. But here's a way
to make the finance company's position invulnerable after the com-
plaining period has passed. And the roof never leaks before this
time has been long gone anyway.
Indeed, the Pennsylvania Bankers Association included a five day
notice provision-that eventually was increased to fifteen by the legis-
lature 16 6 -in the Home Improvement bill it drafted.
1 67
Under any system in which the financing agency can purchase in-
stallment notes free of consumer defenses or can assume this position a
short time after a contract is signed, the risk of dealer fraud rests squarely
with the consumer.168 Although it is true that the buyer chose to purchase
from the dealer who defrauded him, this fact should not be determinative
in deciding where the burden should lie, for it must be noted that the
financing agency selected this dealer before it bought his paper. 169 Further-
more, the financing agency has facilities that the consumer lacks, enabling it
to investigate the dealer's reliability and to make certain that his products,
services and sales techniques are not fraudulent or misleading. The agency
can also protect itself by dealing on a full recourse basis which would
require the dealer to be liable to it for buyer defaults by executing a
repurchase agreement, binding the dealer to buy back repossessed mer-
chandise or by requiring the dealer to set aside sufficient funds to protect
himself against any contingencies.
70
Another reason for shifting the risk of dealer fraud from the consumer
appears from a consideration of which party is better able to bear the risk.
A finance company which loses money on a particular transaction with a
163 Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 13(a)-(b) (1) (ten days' notice).
164 See note 161 supra.
165 Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 13(b) (1).
166 The Installment Credit Committee of the Pennsylvania Bankers Association
originally recommended a five-day period. The period was lengthened to ten days
when the bill was submitted to the legislators, and was finally increased to fifteen days
"by others." Pennsylvania Bankers Association Address 3.
167 See notes 128-134 supra and accompanying text.
168 See Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44
CORNELL L.Q. 38, 66 (1958).
169 Ibid.
170 See Note, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv. 782, 791-93 (1952).
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dealer can recoup the loss in subsequent transactions. The innocent con-
sumer, on the other hand, may find himself bankrupt if defrauded by a
dealer in a single transaction. The argument made by banks and finance
companies that the removal of holder in due course protection "would put
them out of business" has proved a spurious one.17 1 Notes signed on the
purchase of motor vehicles have been unprotected since 1947 in Penn-
sylvania,172 yet the same companies that make the argument continue to
finance automobile sales in great numbers. Furthermore, finance companies
operate successfully in Massachusetts 173 and Maryland 174 which have
removed holder in due course protection from all sales. Counsel for a
large bank admitted candidly that: "While I would fight the change, it
wouldn't be as terrible a thing as many banks will tell you. We check our
dealers carefully and only the marginal finance companies that don't would
be hurt." Thus, it seems that shifting the risk of fraud to finance com-
panies would not only make it more difficult for fraudulent dealers to
operate, but would also result in the elimination of finance companies whose
failure to check on dealers has made fraudulent practices possible.
2. Confession of Judgment
Perhaps the most objectionable practice in consumer credit is that of
requiring the consumer who buys on credit to sign an authorization of entry
of confession of judgment at the time he makes his purchase. Tom dis-
covered to his dismay that he had authorized the finance company to record
a judgment on his property immediately after purchase.175 As soon as he
missed a monthly payment, the entire unpaid balance became due and "any
.. attorney or any court" was empowered to obtain a levy on his prop-
erty without notifying him.1 76 He also expressly waived any "stay or
exemption laws now in force or hereafter enacted." 177
This system does not provide the consumer with any opportunity to
present defenses before execution is issued on the judgment. 78 If the note
171 See id. at 796.
172 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615(g) (Supp. 1964).
173 MAss. GmE. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1964).
174 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1957).
175 See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
176 Installment Sale Contract (for use in Pennsylvania for goods other than
motor vehicles), on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. If
Tom wished to save his real estate or household furnishings after being delinquent
on a payment, he would have had to pay the entire unpaid balance, an "attorney's
fee" of 18% of the balance, and a "late charge" of 5%. Ibid.
1
77 Ibid.
17 8 The process, as described by Philadelphia's District Attorney, James C.
Crumlish, Jr. is as follows:
There is a judgment note signed and it is processed and it is immediately
recorded. There arises some complaint as a result of the work not having
been done satisfactorily. So, the reaction of the consumer, which is a quite
natural one, is that: "I won't make my installments until you satisfactorily
adjust my complaint." And before he knows it, there has been an execution
on the note and his house is about to be sold from under him.
Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 145.
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has been negotiated, its holder may be in an invulnerable position in any
case. But even if defenses are available and there is truth to a finance
company attorney's statement that after execution "anyone with any type
of defense can open a judgment," most people would certainly be unwilling
to pay approximately 300 dollars 17 "to unravel something which should
have been straightened out in the first instance when the complaint was
originally made." 180
Financial interests vigorously support the system since it "saves
us attorneys' fees." 181 They indicate that there are no complaints to file,
no defenses to overcome and no chance that the court might decide the
money is not due.
Although some states have outlawed confession of judgment in their
retail sales acts,' 8 2 the practice is so entrenched in Pennsylvania that
Philadelphia's District Attorney James C. Crumlish termed it a "radical
suggestion . . . to consider that judgment notes should not be recorded
until such time as the defendant has had an opportunity to meet the
complaint." 183
As in the case of holder in due course legislation, financing agencies
complain that restrictions on confession of judgment clauses will destroy
their businesses. Yet in states where new laws have been enacted the
agencies continue to prosper.
3. Licensing
The requirement that vendors and holders of retail installment con-
tracts be licensed is another effective method of controlling objectionable
consumer credit practices. The head of the New York State Attorney
General's fraud bureau has stated, "if they don't behave, we can take their
licenses away and put them out of business." Well enforced licensing
provisions have also been effective in ridding other states of fly by night
vendors.' 8 4 The broad coverage of the proposed Pennsylvania "all-goods"
act provides for licensing of anyone "either as principal, solicitor, agent or
broker in the negotiation, purchasing, or making of a collection on retail
installment contracts ... " 185 Only employees working inside a
regular place of business are exempted. 86
179The Philadelphia Bar Association minimum fee for opening a judgment is
$150, and an attorney in a neighborhood law office estimated that the average fee
charged for handling such a case is more than $300.
18 oDonolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 145 (testimony of Phila-
delphia's District Attorney James C. Crumlish, Jr.).
181 Interview With Finance Company Attorney.
182 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1804.1(c); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 42-88 (1962) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 130(b) (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-37 (1963);
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 403 (3) (c).
183 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 144.
1 8 4 Interview With Chief of New Jersey Consumer Credit Division of Depart-
ment of Banking and Insurance.
185 Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 3.
186 Ibid.
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Many interests oppose the Pennsylvania bill solely because of the
restrictions imposed by the licensing provisions, often on the theories that
licensing entails unnecessary governmental intervention and that "business-
men have the ability to keep their own good house in order ....
The most controversial section of the bill is that requiring licensing of all
"outside salesmen." This provision is sometimes opposed because of the
erroneous impression that all employees of a dealer must be licensed.188
The chairman of the committee to which the bill was referred, for example,
stated that every store owner in his district, whether or not conversant with
the actual terms of the section, had contacted him to complain about it.289
Yet, this licensing provision is called necessary for effective consumer pro-
tection. "As it stands now," a magistrate pointed out, "the homeowner
may not know with whom he is dealing and has no address to go to if the
work is done wrong." Pennsylvania's attorney general favors individual
licensing to prevent violators "from hiding behind a multitude of corpora-
tions and fictitious names." 190
Modification appears to be necessary to harmonize the bill's provisions
with sections in other states 111 exempting banks which already are closely
regulated by other state and federal statutes. 192  In addition, the require-
ment that finance agencies must be organized under the Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Law 113 places an unnecessary restriction on out of
state finance companies.
For licensing to achieve optimum effectiveness, the powers granted to
the agency responsible for supervising licensing must be selected with a
view to providing procedures directly aimed at alleviating existing fraud-
ulent practices. Even though an agency may have the authority to hold
hearings and subpoena records, it may be handicapped by the restricted
conditions under which it can conduct investigations. In Maryland, the
commissioner may act only after a written complaint has been filed by a
1
8 7 Donolow Committee Hearings, June 13, 1962, at 605 (testimony of Kenneth
Orr, Better Business Bureau of Pittsburgh).
188 See Donolow Committee Hearings, May 15, 1963, at 33 (testimony of John
Means, Managing Director of the Pennsylvania Retailers Association); Interview
With Banking Official. The Chief of the Consumer Credit Division of the New
Jersey Bureau of Banking stated that one of the chief problems faced in passing
a bill licensing salesmen is convincing businessmen that all of their secretaries and
janitors will not have to be licensed.
189 Interview With Pennsylvania State Senator Rowland B. Mahany.
190 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 15, 1963, at 22 (statement of Walter
Alessandroni). A similar view was expressed by the Chief of the Ohio Attorney
General's Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section in a memorandum on file in Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania: "Were the state to pass a law requiring
all who engage in door-to-door sales and solicitations to register with local law
enforcement officials, notice of their operations would be gained."
191 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 154 (1957) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-2
(1963).
192 Memorandum on the Proposed Retail Installment Sales Act and the Penn-
sylvania Usury Act, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
This memorandum was sent from a finance company counsel to the chairman of the
state banking committee.
193 Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 5 (a).
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consumer; 1  in New Jersey he must have "reasonable cause to believe
that any licensee, or any other person, has violated any of the provisions"
of the act.19 5 In contrast, the sponsors of the Pennsylvania "all-goods" act
proposed that the secretary of banking have power "at any time [to] in-
vestigate the business, affairs and activities and examine books . . 196
This ability to spot check companies periodically would be a most effective
way of insuring compliance with the act. The practice followed in many
states of issuing a license simply on the basis of facts which a prospective
licensee states in an application form is not sufficient to apprise the agency
that the applicant may have fraudulently conducted business in other states
or that he may presently be unable to deliver the goods which he offers.
The need for licensing provisions which can be administered by a
specific agency is demonstrated by an investigation of the unsuccessful
results that occur when consumer protection depends on enforcement by
county district attorneys. Local law enforcement authorities have numer-
ous criminal statutes to enforce and can devote only limited time to retail
installment legislation.197 The Pennsylvania Home Improvement Finance
Act, for example, gave the attorney general or district attorney of each
county power to initiate court action to restrain violation.'9 8 Even though
the Pennsylvania Bankers Association hoped that the latter section would
"protect the small consumer by keeping an unscrupulous contractor from
doing business," 199 a member of the drafting committee asserted that, so
far as he knew, "no restraining order had been sought under the act."
On the other hand, the New Jersey Retail Installment Sales Act 200 gives
the consumer credit division of the department of banking and insurance
the power not only to revoke or suspend licenses 201 but also to sue for
and collect the penalties provided for violation of any of the act's
provisions 202
4. "Cooling Off" Period
Another protective measure aimed at aiding consumers who are victims
of high pressure sales techniques was enacted in Pennsylvania's Home Im-
provement Finance Act. This act requires that a "cooling off" period
provision which would permit the purchaser to rescind the sale before five
P.M. on the next business day after he has signed be placed in every con-
19 4 MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 162(a) (1957).
'05 N.J. STAT. AN. § 17:16C-15 (1963).
196 Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 10(a). A similar section appears in the Motor
Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 611 (Supp. 1964).
17 See notes 259-261 infra and accompanying text.
1 98 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-502 (Supp. 1964).
199 Pennsylvania Bankers Association Address 3.
200 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-1 to -61 (1963).
201 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-11 (1963).
2 02 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-56 (1963).
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tract, subject only to liquidated damage provisions,203 limited by the act
to ten percent of the cash price.204  This section was not included in the
bill as originally drafted by the Pennsylvania Bankers Association,20 5 some
of whose members vehemently opposed it as "against human nature. It
is fundamentally wrong to let the buyer out once the seller has built up his
product and then closes the deal. Things just aren't sold like that in the
real world." 206 It was pointed out that any purchaser who does not wish
to pay can cancel a contract, even "if the sale was made in good faith and
everything was clean," thus operating to hurt the legitimate businessman
20 7
Those who sponsored the "cooling off" clause conceive of it as a neces-
sary protection for consumers "who have been pressured into overbuying
or buying what they do not want by a clever salesman. Too often, the
salesman makes vast oral promises which do not appear in the contract.
Sometimes, the real terms of the purchase are not disclosed .... ,, 20s
The files of the frauds division of the Philadelphia district attorney's
office 2o9 are replete with complaints from consumers who have had re-
quests for cancellation refused, although made only hours after signing.
One finance company counsel has said that "they [dealers] may give him a
hard time, but he can always get out of it." The "hard time," however,
has been known to cost the consumer hundreds of dollars.
2 1 0
While high pressure salesmen would be greatly handicapped by a
cooling off period, legitimate business should not be affected. Many
businesses, even without legal compulsion, allow customers to cancel with-
out penalty and even accept goods returned a reasonable time after
delivery 21 1
The suggestion which appears to balance most effectively the interest
of consumers in rescinding hasty purchases and the businessman's interest
in finalizing a sale is the forty-eight hour "cooling off" period proposed by
the chief counsel of the Philadelphia Legal Aid Society.212 The company's
203 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-202(c) (4) (Supp. 1964).
204 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-206(f) (Supp. 1964).
205 The section was "inserted by the legislators sponsoring the legislation or as
a result of views expressed by them." Pennsylvania Bankers Association Address 3.
206 Interview With Bank Counsel.
207 Donolow Committee Hearings, June 13, 1962, at 610 (testimony of Kenneth
Orr, Better Business Bureau of Pittsburgh).
208 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 39 (testimony of Robert D.
Abrahams, Chief Counsel, Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia).
209 See note 304 infra.
2 1 0 In one case the consumer was forced to pay $175 and in another $90 in
order to cancel. Fraud Division Files.
211 Better Business Bureau, I Want My Money Back!, on file in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania.
2 12 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 39 (testimony of Robert D.
Abrahams, Chief Counsel, Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia). Longer cooling off
periods have been suggested. A finance company president suggested a seven-day
period if shortly thereafter his company could then gain holder in due course
protection. A provision for a seven-day period was recently introduced in the Cali-
fornia legislature. California Consumer Counsel News Exchange, Feb. 18, 1965, p. 4.
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actual expenses would be defrayed by the consumer's paying a small can-
cellation fee of about one percent of the purchase price.
2
13
5. Disclosure
All retail installment legislation contains provisions to insure full dis-
closure of the terms of the agreement to the buyer.214  Those provisions
which the state feels are particularly important, such as requesting the
buyer to keep a copy of the contract, are required to be printed in each
contract in large bold type.215 Statutes require that the buyer receive a
copy of the written contract, 216 and over half of the statutes prohibit the
signing of contracts containing blank spaces.217 Provisions also require a
detailed itemization of the charges including a statement of the total time
sale price to the buyer.2 18  Still other sections prevent the buyer from
waiving the protection of the act.
219
Regulation of financing charges provided for in most retail sales acts,
2 2 0
is necessary in consumer protection legislation since
the difference . . . between the actual, let's say, cash price of an
article and the total price charged by a seller, if it is to be repaid
on time payments, is not [otherwise] regulated. It is not con-
sidered to be interest and the courts have said it is not covered by
the general and particular laws [governing usury and loan com-
pany rates] .221
2 1 Donolov Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 39 (testimony of Robert D.
Abrahams, Chief Counsel, Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia).
214 Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 854, 866-67 (1958). A number of states deal with
this problem exclusively in their statutes. Id. at 866 n.89.
215 E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1803.2; CONN. GEN. STAT. RE . § 42-84(c) (3) (1962);
DEL-. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4304(c) (Supp. 1964) ; ILL. ANr. STAT. ch. 121Y2, § 224(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1960) ; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 402(2) (b).
218E.g., CAL. CrV. CODE §1803.7; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §42-84(a) (1962);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §4309 (Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 12132, §226
(Smith-Hurd 1960) ; MD. ANN. CODE art 83, § 128(b) (1957) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 255, § 13 (1956) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-23 (1963) ; N.Y. PERs. PROP.
LAW § 405; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.02 (Page 1962).
217 Exception is made for identifying numbers or marks and sometimes the due
date of the first installment. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 42-84(a) (1962); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 12132, § 229 (Smith-Hurd 1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 130 (a)
(1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-22 (1963); N.Y. PEAS. PROP. LAW § 402(4);
Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 11(d) ; Note, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 854, 867 (1958).
218 These provisions are the most uniform of the retail installment sales acts.
Id. at 869; e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.3; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 42-84(b) (1962) ;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4305 (Supp. 1964) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y2, § 225 (Smith-
Hurd 1960) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 129 (1957) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255,
§12 (1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:16C-27 (1963); N.Y. Pans. PROP. LAW
§ 402(3) (b) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1317.04 (Page 1962) ; Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965,
§ 11(c) (2).
219 E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1801.1; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4302 (Supp. 1964);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y2, §244 (Smith-Hurd 1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§.148 (1957); Pa. S. 323, Sess. of 1965, § 24. For a discussion of disclosure pro-
visions see Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CoRNELL
L.Q. 38, 44-47 (1958) ; Note, 58 COLUm. L. Riv. 854, 866-69 (1958).
220 CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 270-77 (chart 13) (1965).
221 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 19-20 (statement of David
Stahl, Attorney General of Pennsylvania).
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Unless these charges are regulated in all states, an incongruous situation
will exist, since the rate charged the prospective purchaser in an inde-
pendent loan transaction is controlled, while the identical charges made by
the finance company as holder of a retail installment contract go
unregulated.
22 2
The regulation of finance charges required to prevent exhorbitant
costs includes: restrictions on the maximum percentage rate and charges for
late payment and prepayment; limitations on the "balloon note" technique
calling for relatively small regular payments and a final large payment; close
supervision of insurance charges; restrictions on "add-on" and acceleration
provisions; and sections providing protections upon default.
22
3
6. Attorneys' Fees
While a state agency may apply administrative sanctions against a
retail installment seller and a district attorney may bring a criminal action,
the consumer may still have to initiate a civil suit to effect restitution.
California has enacted a provision in its retail sales act awarding reasonable
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a private action regardless of
whether initiated by buyer, seller or holder. A number of attorneys
interviewed support such a statute on the grounds that it tends to alleviate
the financial burden of initiating a private action which must be surmounted
by any consumer wishing to assert a violation of the act.
7. Conclusion
Retail sales acts alone will not put an end to consumer fraud, but they
do provide a useful tool not only to curb the unscrupulous businessman but
also to set standards for all who deal in consumer credit. The business-
man's claim that governmental regulation will serve to injure the legitimate
concern has been answered by Barnett Levy, Assistant Attorney General
in Charge of the Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection in New York.
Mr. Levy has said that even if legitimate businesses incur additional ex-
pense and difficulty as a result of consumer protection legislation, the cost
is a necessary one if the process saves millions of dollars for thousands of
innocent consumers.
B. Enforcement of Consumer Legislation
1. Use of Criminal Statutes
Although the district attorney has the responsibility of enforcing state
criminal laws, Tom could not obtain aid from this source.22 6 One reason
222 See cases cited note 116 supra; Koch, Time Sales Contracts and Other Pitfalls
of Installment Lending, 28 TEXAs B.J. 181 (1965).
223 See full discussion in Hogan, supra note 219, at 47-65; Note, 58 CoLum.
L. REv. 854, 869-82 (1958).224 In many instances, initiation of an investigation by an enforcement agency
leads to the consumer's obtaining restitution without court action. See notes 273,
308, 387 infra and accompanying text.
225 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1811.1.
226 See note 47 supra and accompanying text
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for this lack of protection is the difficulty in obtaining convictions against
fraudulent operators. To a great extent this is due to the restrictive inter-
pretation which most courts give to false pretense statutes. 227 It is widely
held that to constitute a false pretense there must be an "assertion of an
existing fact, not a promise to perform some act in the future." 228 This is
true even if "the promisor never intended to perform." 229
An example of this important distinction can be found in the Pennsyl-
vania case of Commonwealth v. Becker.230 There two counts of the indict-
ment alleged that the defendant had promised each of his victims a new
roof and had failed to make any attempt to perform. Conviction on one
count was reversed because the defendant was paid before he commenced
work and therefore "the money was not obtained under the false pretense
. . . that a new roof had been installed." 2 3 1 The conviction on the second
count was affirmed on the ground that the defendant was paid after repre-
senting that the new roof had already been installed,2 32 and this representa-
tion was sufficient to constitute the required false pretense.
This differentiation appears to be based chiefly upon the fear that if
prosecution were permitted for false promises, "the way would be open
for every victim of a bad bargain to resort to criminal proceedings to even
the score with a judgment proof adversary." 2 In addition it is felt that
there would be a real risk of prosecuting someone guilty of nothing more
than an inability or refusal to pay his debts.23 4 These fears have been
attacked by Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in
People v. Ashley: 2 3 5
Whether the pretense is a false promise or a misrepresentation of
fact, the defendant's intent must be proved in both instances by
something more than mere proof of nonperformance or actual
falsity . . . and the defendant is entitled to have the jury in-
structed to that effect.
2 36
Although Joseph Stone, Chief of the Complaints Bureau of New York
City's District Attorney's Office, believes that permitting false promises
to be made criminal would flood his division with simple "breach of con-
tract" cases, a few states have rejected the distinction between false promises
227 For a thorough discussion of the problem see Pearce, Theft by False Prom-
ises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (1953).
228 E.g., CommonNvealth v. Moore, 99 Pa. 570, 574 (1882).
229 Commonvealth v. Kelinson, 199 Pa. Super. 135, 143, 184 A.2d 374, 378
(1962).
230 151 Pa. Super. 169, 30 A.2d 195 (1943).
231 Id. at 172, 30 A.2d at 197.
= Id. at 173, 30 A.2d at 197.
283 Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
234 Ibid.
235 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
23 Id. at 264, 267 P.2d at 282.
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and false pretenses by judicial decision237 or statute.23 s  California is the
only state whose courts have held that false pretenses include all promises
made with intent not to perform,23 9 while Massachusetts and Rhode Island
reach the same result by holding that false statements of present intention
constitute false representations of an existing fact and are therefore crim-
inally actionable. 240 Two other states have amended their criminal statutes
to include false promises made with present intention not to perform. 241
Other statutes which prohibit "fraudulent representation, pretense, token,
or writing" have been held by some courts to encompass promises as to
"future facts, events and transactions." 242 Analysis of the litigation in
states that have rejected the distinction leads to the conclusion that there
is "not a shred of evidence" to substantiate fears that broadening the defini-
tion of false pretenses would hinder legitimate business operations.243
In addition to false pretense statutes, district attorneys can prosecute
under a great number of narrowly drawn statutes which specifically pro-
hibit a vast number of objectionable practices. 244 In the area of fraudulent
advertising, for example, the variety of statutes is almost unlimited.245
Yet, even when a law enforcement official believes that a particular
scheme has been made actionable by statute, he often does not prosecute
because of a widely held belief that, except in the most egregious circum-
stances, fraudulent operators should not be treated like criminals. Lawyers,
business leaders and prosecutors have stated that "judges, juries and district
attorneys do not like to put businessmen in jail." One district attorney,
when asked by the attorney general to prosecute an alleged fraudulent
237 See People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S.
900 (1954); People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 193 N.E. 150 (1934); Commonwealth v.
Green, 326 Mass. 344, 94 N.E.2d 260 (1950); State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245,
87 N.E.2d 358 (Ct. App. 1949) ; State v. McMahon, 49 R.I. 107, 140 At. 359 (1928).
238 Whoever (1) by false pretense or pretenses, or by a promissory represen-
tation as to some future action to be taken by the person making the repre-
sentation where made with the present intent that such future action would
not be performed or carried out ....
N -. Rav. STAT. § 28-1207 (1964).
Any person who, knowingly or designedly, with intent to cheat or defraud
any other person, obtains any . . . thing of value by means of false prom-
ises, statements, representations, tokens, writings or pretenses ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:111-1 (1953).
239 People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 265, 267 P.2d 271, 283, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 900 (1954).
240 Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 348, 94 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1950);
State v. McMahon, 49 R.I. 107, 108, 140 Ati. 359, 360 (1928).
241 See note 238 mipra.
2 State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 261, 87 N.E.2d 358, 367 (Ct. App. 1949).
243 Pearce, supra note 227, at 1007.
2 44 In Pennsylvania, for example, individual statutes prohibit the fraudulent mark-
ing of an item as gold, gold fineness, silver, coin silver, or a mounting as sterling,
or as coin. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4872-77 (1963); see N.Y. PENAL LAw
§§ 423-31.
245 Note, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1097-1111 (1956).
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operator, retorted: "I can't even get a conviction when they stick a gun in
somebody's back, how can I get one when they just talk him out of his
money."
In addition, in the relatively few cases where convictions are obtained,
many of the violators receive exceedingly mild treatment. The Philadelphia
Bulletin was not particularly impressed with the "wrist slap" received by
one racketeer:
C. Wilson Kile of Lansdowne should be a very happy man
today.
He has been sentenced to one year in prison for making and
selling fake automobile parts. He can serve a little jolt like this, as
the racketeers say, "standing on his head." And keep a fortune
which the N.Y. district attorney estimates at $300,000, made by
his crimes.
It is not reassuring to the public to know that he will be at
liberty in a year, to resume the dangerous activities .... 246
2. Injunctive Protection
In order to overcome the difficulty of obtaining meaningful criminal
sanctions, it has been suggested that "states adopt legislation aimed at pro-
tecting the consumer by . . . use of an injunction." 247 Recently, a few
states have adopted such legislation permitting a law enforcement official to
petition the court for an injunction prohibiting any "deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, [or] misrepresentation . . .in connection with the
sale or advertisement of any merchandise." 248 The prerequisites for crimi-
nal prosecution, namely, knowledge of the falsity of the statements made and
intent to defraud, are not required in these injunction statutes. 249 No one
need be defrauded and indeed the injunction can be granted when a likeli-
hood exists that a person "is about to engage in" a practice made illegal by
the act.250 Furthermore, while most legislatures and courts consistently
assert that criminal false pretense statutes require the misrepresentation of
a past or presently existing fact,251 an injunction statute is not criminal
in nature and can more easily include "a false promise."
248 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, August 25, 1955, p. 12, col. 1.
247 Memorandum From the Chief of the Ohio Consumer Frauds and Crimes
Section of the Attorney General's Office 7, on file in Biddle Law Library, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania [hereinafter cited as Ohio Memorandum].
2 4 8 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1212, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-2 (1964); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.79 (Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 51-15-02 (Supp. 1965).
249 "[C riminal action is limited by the requirement of proof of a requisite intent
to defraud. Because criminal law and the law of fraud in particular finds its roots
in common law, the traditional stringent requirements of definite proof of the elements
of the crime impedes successful prosecution of many cases." Ohio Memorandum 7.250 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, § 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-8 (1964); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.80 (Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 51-15-07 (Supp. 1965).
21 See notes 227-232 supra and accompanying text.
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Another important consumer benefit provided by these statutes, is
the power they give the law enforcement official to petition the court "to
restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or personal
which may have been acquired by means of any practices declared to be
unlawful." -2 Reparation thus can be obtained without the payment of
attorney's fees.2 3  In addition, an injunction is directed against halting a
company's particular practice, while criminal prosecution leads only to the
incarceration of a particular individual and the activity can be continued by
other members of his business;2
The mere threat of an injunction should in many cases halt the offend-
ing activities without the need for its issuance to formalize the effectiveness
of this threat. New York has adopted a procedure whereby the attorney
general promises not to seek an injunction against any company filing "an
assurance of discontinuance of any act or practice" considered illegal under
the act.255 It also may be stipulated that the alleged violator make a
"voluntary payment" of the state's "cost of investigation" in an amount up
to 2,000 dollars.256  No action by any court is provided for in the statute
outlining this process. Noncompliance by the company with its "assur-
ance," constitutes prima facie evidence in any civil action or proceeding
instituted by the attorney general.
257
Injunction statutes of this type are of recent vintage and thus the
many questions which will arise in their administration have not as yet
been fully resolved through litigation. Hopefully, legislators will realize
the potential benefits of this type statute in reducing fraud, and prosecution
under the resulting injunction statutes will effectively resolve any problems
presented.
3. Shift of Responsibility to State Officials
Another attempt to protect more effectively the consumer has led some
states to shift the primary responsibility for enforcing consumer legislation
252 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§56:8-8 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-06 (Supp. 1965).
253 "Even if investigation produces enough evidence to bring a case to court, and
the district attorney is able to get a conviction, it remains for the complainant to bring
action to recover whatever losses he may have suffered." N.Y. Herald Tribune,
March 7, 1965, p. 4 (Magazine).2 54 The District Attorney of Philadelphia was recently faced with a rash of cases
involving false and misleading practices in the sale and advertisement of carpeting.
Criminal prosecution of the offenders was rejected because it was felt that this would
only halt individual salesmen. Frauds Division Files; see note 261 infra.
Instead an injunction was sought, and defendants in a consent decree agreed to
halt certain objectionable activities. Commonwealth ex rel. Crumlish v. Carpetland
& Carpetville, Inc., Case No. 4042, Phila. C.P. No. 8, July 29, 1964.255N.Y. ExEc. LAw §63(15). See also WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §19:86:100
(Sup 1964).
5N.Y. ExEc. LAw §63(15). According to the 1964 Annual Report of the
New York State Bureau of Consumer Frauds & Protection, on file in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Report], a total of
$22,812.00 was collected by the state treasury under this statute.
257N.Y. ExEc. LAw §63(15).
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from local district attorneys to state officials or agencies.2 58  The main
reason for this change is that local officials have been overburdened with
the problems incident to protecting the public from physical harm 259 and
have not been able to enforce consumer legislation. 260  For example, a study
of prosecutions under false advertising statutes "showed clearly that most
jurisdictions have never used the statutes at all, and that only a few have
initiated more than a handful of prosecutions." 261 Some local law enforce-
ment officials do not even consider enforcement of advertising laws their
responsibility, adopting an attitude similar to that expressed by an assistant
district attorney of a large Pennsylvania county: "Harrisburg passed these
laws; they should certainly enforce them." Yet the authority of Pennsyl-
vania state officials to enter into or initiate prosecution of even the most
flagrant violators is extremely limited.2V
Shifting the burden of consumer protection to statewide agencies
appears to have led to more effective enforcement in states which have
adopted this procedure. A statewide organization can more readily assess
the most effective means of halting widespread fraudulent practices, and its
extensive authority will give it the power to do so. These agencies also
have larger staffs than most municipalities and therefore can appoint one
man or even a group of men to deal exclusively with consumer problems.
Reliance on state authority, however, need not entail the complete re-
moval of the district attorneys' powers to enforce consumer statutes. Local
operations might escape surveillance by a statewide office and individual
district attorneys may well be interested in solving their own problems. A
258 A recent study of consumer protection activities concludes that "a trend is
rapidly developing to expand the function of the State Attorney General to deal
directly with consumer fraud protection . . . ." National Better Business Bureau,
The Growth of State Consumer Frauds Bureaus, June 1965, p. 4 [hereinafter cited
as Fraud Bureaus].
259 Interview With District Attorney; cf. Note, 56 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1018, 1064
(1956).
260 Three assistant district attorneys interviewed in one Pennsylvania county
asserted that they could recall only one instance when a fraud case had been prose-
cuted in their county.
261 See Note, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1018, 1063 (1956). A study of the cases under
the Pennsylvania advertising statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4857 (1963), disclosed
no reported convictions. Commonwealth v. Masters of Lancaster, Inc., 199 Pa. Super.
36, 40, 184 A. 2d 347, 350 (1962) asserts that there exists only one other case which
discusses the construction of the statute. The second case is contained in an old
district court report, Commonwealth ex rel. Cunningham v. Dean, 30 Pa. Dist. 563
(Ct. Quarter Sess. Philadelphia County, 1921).
262 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 817 (1962) (attorney general can intervene
only when requested to do so in writing by president judge of district having juris-
diction). A Pennsylvania deputy attorney general stated that this permission was
very difficult to obtain and therefore was rarely requested.
The better business bureau survey of consumer fraud bureaus stated that "some
Attorneys General reported that they have no authority, responsibility or facilities
to investigate or prosecute those who perpetrate consumer frauds." Fraud Bureaus.
See also statement by the Attorney General of Ohio that "the Attorney General does not
have the authority, nor does he think it proper, for his office to enter into the fields
of investigation and prosecution." Ohio Consumer Frauds and Crimes Bull. 2-118-64
(Feb. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Ohio Bulletin].
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grant of concurrent jurisdiction should provide both with the necessary
powers.2 3
C. Consumer Fraud Bureaus
A growing number of states have entrusted enforcement of consumer
laws to special bureaus organized to deal with all aspects of the problem.
The first such agency, the New York State Bureau of Consumer Frauds
and Protection, was established in 1959.264 Seventeen other states now
have some type of organization,23 although each organization differs widely
in its statutory authority, scope of operation and even as to the govern-
mental department under which it functions. The overall success of these
bureaus depends not only upon their ability to enforce legislation but also
upon their development of comprehensive programs dealing with all facets
of consumer protection.
1. Functions
The chief of the New York Frauds Bureau, for example, estimates
that more than ninety percent of the work of his organization is devoted to
mediating buyer and seller disagreements. 26 6  During 1964 more than
eleven thousand consumers visited the frauds bureau office to register
complaints, 267 and thousands of persons, many from other states and foreign
countries, wrote that they were defrauded by New York businessmen.268
Each grievance, no matter how small, is processed by one of the fifteen
staff members.269 While a few are deemed unfounded,270 most of the
263 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.80 (Supp. 1964) (injunction power given
to Commissioner of Business Development and to county district attorneys).
2G4 Warne, "Consumer Protective Movements on the State and Local Levels-
1964," at 19, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania [hereinafter
cited as Warne] ; Fraud Bureaus 1. Two years earlier, the attorney general had named
two assistants to handle complaints. See ibid.; 1957 N.Y. ATr'y GENERAL ANNUAL
REP. 29. The bureau was then formed because of the increasing number of com-
plaints.
2 65 The Better Business Bureau reports that there are 15 bureaus, Fraud Bu-
reaus 1. A Reader's Digest report adds two additional states, Eisenberg, You Can
Get Your Money Back, Reader's Digest, Feb. 1964, pp. 131, 135. Still another state
is added by Warne 27. The states included are: Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Hawaii. Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
North Dakota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Washington, and Wis-
consin.
266 Information about the New York bureau was obtained in an interview with
Chief Barnett Levy. The bureau describes its four areas of activity as mediation,
education, legislation, and litigation. N.Y. Report 1.
267 Ibid.
268 The Bureau received over 25,000 pieces of mail in 1964 and made or received
more than 60,000 telephone calls. Ibid. Its most publicized international complaint
was registered by Cuban residents who had been defrauded by a New York travel
agency. The Bureau prosecuted the agency officials and also sent several representa-
tives to Mexico City to aid prosecutions that had been instituted there. N.Y.
Report 4.
269 Eisenberg, rupra note 265, at 135.
270 "When we feel that a consumer's claim is unjustified, we tell him so. We
won't knuckle under to a firm, but neither will we browbeat it." Id. at 134 (state-
ment by New York Bureau Chief).
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others are settled by a phone call to the company to iron out misunder-
standings. When court action is deemed necessary to halt any practice
which the company refuses to discontinue,2 71 the proceeding is instituted
by the attorney general on behalf of all interested parties and the consumer
pays no attorneys' fees. 2 7 2 More than a million dollars has been returned to
defrauded consumers as a result of the bureau's informal mediation process
and court action.
273
The California Consumer Counsel, on the other hand, functions
primarily as an advisor to the Governor, recommending consumer legisla-
tion and lobbying for its passage.274 Pursuant to the latter function, agency
representatives appear at administrative hearings, and before legislative
study committees, and other governmental groups that deal with consumer
problems.
275
Consumer fraud bureaus also serve a useful function by aiding industry
self-regulation attempts. 276 The New York bureau, for example, holds
conferences with automobile industry representatives to discuss programs
aimed at the elimination of misleading advertising and selling practices.
277
Plans are also being instituted for the joint drafting of a code of ethics
by the bureau and the hearing aid industry---"the first Industry-Govern-
ment code established in the country." 
278
Other consumer protection groups emphasize their function of serving
as "a coordinating or clearing agency to assist local and state governmental
agencies [in preventing] . . . fraudulent practices in advertising, sales
and other fields." 279 The need for a statewide agency to fulfill this role
was outlined by the chief of the Ohio Attorney General's Consumer Frauds
and Crimes Section:
Often time is of the essence in stopping consumer frauds. Just as
fast as they talk, these perpetrators of consumer frauds move off
into greener pastures. If the need to report to a central clearing
house is impressed deeply upon local law enforcement officers, this
office could relay the information rapidly and have all local law
271 See notes 255-257 spra and accompanying text.
2 72 See N.Y. PRs. PROP. LAW § 63(12).
273 N.Y. Report 11. In one order, a New York supreme court dissolved a cor-
poration which had defrauded thousands of homeowners through a deceptive referral
plan and provided for a $25,000 escrow fund for complaint adjustments. Id. at 8.
274 See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12050-057. See generally 23 LEGAL Am BRIEF CASE
267-69 (1965).
2
756C.. Gov'T CODE §12055(a); see SOmE COxsumR GA Ns IN CAoONIA
2-10 (1964).
27
6 In this regard see discussion of better business bureau activity, supra note 70
and accompanying text.
277 N.Y. Report 6.
278 Id. at 2.
279 Letter From Col. George Mingle, Chief, Consumer Frauds and Crimes Sec-
tion, Office of the Ohio Attorney General to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, July 20, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
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enforcement agencies on the lookout for specific practitioners of
the art of fraud.
280
This consumer bureau has instituted a bulletin service connecting more
than twelve hundred different Ohio agencies including prosecuting attor-
neys, sheriffs, police offices and better business bureaus. These bulletins
deal with more than forty topics covering activities of a possibly illegal
nature 281 and include information concerning the activities of groups of
fraudulent operators 28 2 and the results of investigations by the attorney
general's office 283 and the functions of various state 28 4 and federal
agencies.
28 5
Additional methods of coordinating statewide fraud prevention pro-
grams have also been devised. Michigan's consumer fraud bureau, for
example, advises private attorneys and county district attorneys "concerning
legal theories and approaches that may be used in dealing with business
firms which have improper business practices." 286 California has attacked
this problem on two fronts. First, the Governor's Consumer Counsel has
instituted a training program for local law enforcement officials which
emphasizes specialized methods of detection and prosecution of de-
frauders.28 7  At the same time the consumer fraud unit of the attorney
general's office undertakes multi-county fraud investigations with local law
enforcement officials.
288
To be even more effective bureaus should also supplement their intra-
state coordination plans by initiating programs of cooperation with law
enforcement officials and protection agencies in other states to form a
national fraud network. President Johnson's Special Assistant for Con-
sumer Affairs has announced that plans have been made "to work closely
280 Ohio Memorandum 5.
281 Letter From Col. George Mingle, Chief Consumer Frauds and Crimes Sec-
tion, Office of the Ohio Attorney General to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, July 20, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
E.g., Ohio Bulletin 6-144-65 (June, 1965) (bait advertising); 8-104-63 (Aug., 1963)
(debt pooling). California Consumer Counsel also publishes a bulletin for law enforce-
ment officials, containing reports of action taken against fraudulent operators by
various governmental agencies. CALIFORNIA CONSUMER COUNSEL REP. 18 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA REP.].
282 Ohio Bulletin 5-123-64 (May, 1964) (description of fraudulent operation out
of Pittsburgh).
283 Ohio Bulletin 8-103-63 (Aug., 1963) (used car sales) ; 10-110-63 (Oct., 1963)
(loan solicitations by mail).
284 Ohio Bulletin 3-140-65 (March, 1965) (state securities division).
28s5 Ohio Bulletin 2-138-65 (Feb., 1965) (Federal Trade Commission); 1-136-65
(Jan., 1965) (Post Office).
28SLetter From Maurice E. Hunt, Field Representative, Consumer Protection,
Antitrust and Public Service Division, State of Michigan, to the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, June 28, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania.
287 CALIFORNIA REP. 18.
28s Frauds Bureau 3.
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with the National Association of Attorneys' General to recommend ways
to coordinate the consumer fraud activities in the states." 289
Consumer councils should also assist in informing the public of the
"pitfalls they face in today's market place and in their homes." 290 Mass
dissemination of leaflets,29 1 consumer conferences, speeches before inter-
ested groups and over mass media, and movies outlining consumer problems
have all been integrated into successful consumer education programs.
m2
2. Formation
Only five of the consumer fraud bureaus established to date have been
authorized by statute.293 The others have been organized by the attorney
general simply designating assistants who are to assume consumer protec-
tion functions.294 In describing the formation of his office, Barnett Levy,
Chief of the New York Bureau, remarked that "we might still not be
started if we had to wait for an enabling statute." He stated that New
York's Attorney General, Louis Lefkowitz, felt that one of his duties was
to protect consumers and directed that part of his budget be set aside each
year to perform this function. Once a bureau is formed, Mr. Levy explained,
it becomes easier to secure the passage of desired legislation 2 95 and to
obtain the funds necessary to expand facilities. A Pennsylvania state
senator stated that if a bureau were organized by the attorney general, it
would be difficult to vote against appropriations which might halt or curtail
its work because of the likelihood of voter disapproval. Statutes author-
izing the formation of consumer councils, however, may serve the function
of clearly defining the purposes for which a bureau is created, expanding in
some cases the scope of activities beyond that which the attorney general
would otherwise perform. States have passed statutes authorizing the
governor to appoint an individual 296 or a committee 297 to advise him, or
expanding the consumer protection duties of an existing agency.
298
The problems that exist in a state without a consumer council were
vividly indicated recently in Pennsylvania. After publication of a magazine
289 Letter From Esther Peterson to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
July 7, 1965, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
290 N.Y. Report 7.
291 The New York Bureau, for example, distributes a pamphlet, "Your A B C's
of Careful Buying," which it prints in both English and Spanish. Ibid.
292 See N.Y. Bureau 7; CALIFORNIA REP. 17.
293 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12050-57; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-1 70a (1958);
Hawaii Laws 1964, Act 50, p. 65 (directive on use of appropriations to attorney
general's office); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 6, § 115 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 362.07-.241 (1957) (consumer protection functions given to commissioner of busi-
ness development).
294 See Warne iii-iv.
295 See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAws § 63(15); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350.
296 E.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12050.
2 97 The Massachusetts council consists of eight members, one of which must be a
representative of the AFL-CIO and no more than five of which may represent one
political party. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 6, § 115 (1963).
298 In Minnesota the function is handled by the Commissioner of Business De-
velopment. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 362.07-.241 (1957).
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article telling citizens in states where no fraud bureau existed to "register
your complaint with your attorney general," 299 "literally hundreds of com-
plaints poured into [the attorney general's office] . . . . We just had to
tell the people that we weren't set up to handle complaints and they'd have
to see either a private attorney or obtain a criminal warrant from a
magistrate." 300
Even more significant is that there is little chance of improvement in
the Pennsylvania situation in the near future. Those who claim that Penn-
sylvania's problems will be solved by one of the four bills introduced into
the legislature this session 301 to establish a consumer council should bear in
mind the deaths of the four previous bills introduced in earlier sessions.3 0 2
Even though the chances of passage for such a bill have been assessed as
"dismal," 303 the attorney general's office refuses to take the initiative in
helping the consumer battle fraudulent operators.
3. Local Bureaus
In states that do not as yet have consumer councils, county district
attorneys' offices may help fill the void that exists in consumer protection.
In 1961 the Philadelphia District Attorney's office created a frauds division
in its complaint department.30 4  Ten county detectives are assigned to
listen to fraud complaints on a full time basis. In cases clearly within the
criminal statutes, where the scheme has caused great harm to the public
or a particular individual, even a single complaint may trigger an investiga-
tion by the division and a report to the legal staff for prosecution.
305
Even when the complaint is civil in nature, the detective will try to
arrange a settlement despite the fact that his only official duty is to "advise
the complainant to seek the services of a qualified attorney." 300 He will
always make a phone call or write a letter in an attempt to resolve any
misunderstanding no matter how small the amount involved.307 The mere
299 Eisenberg, stupra note 265, at 135.
300 Interview With Pennsylvania Deputy Attorney General. Complaints were
also made in other states, causing the Attorney General of Ohio, for example, to
assert that it led to "considerable misunderstandings in our state." Ohio Bulletin
2-118-64 (Feb., 1964).
301 Pa. S. No. 391, Sess. of 1965; Pa. H.R. Nos. 181, 455, 734 Sess. of 1965.
3 02 Pa. H.R. No. 1417, Sess. of 1963; Pa. S. No. 655, Sess. of 1961; Pa. H.R.
Nos. 2088, 2347, Sess. of 1959.
303 Interview With Counsel To Pennsylvania State Investigating Committee.
3 0 4 Information about this program was obtained in interviews with James C.
Crumlish, Jr., District Attorney, Francis J. Lederer, Chief of County Detectives, and
Joseph McCarrie, Sergeant in Charge of the Frauds Division. The authors of this
comment were given access to the confidential files of the frauds division and wish
to express their appreciation to Assistant District Attorney Anthony J. Smith, Chief
of the Complaints Division.
309 See Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 33, col. 1 (two men arrested on
charges of cheating an 87 year old, partially blind man out of more than $10,000 in
a home improvement scheme).
306 The District Attorney's Office [Philadelphia], Public News Bull. No. 2.
307 The frauds division's smallest case involved efforts resulting in a refund of
twenty cents to a complainant who had received a previous day's newspaper when
he deposited money in a coinbox. Frauds Division Files.
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fact that it is the district attorney's office which is conducting the negotia-
tions serves to induce businessmen to adjust consumer complaints.A05 If
after a number of complaints the sellers remain adamant in their refusal to
negotiate, the detective will "tell the companies that if they don't cooperate,
we'll put a red line under their names and will prosecute if they cause any
more trouble." 309 District Attorney James C. Crumlish, Jr., reported to
a state senate committee that:
[T]hese people who are in business in these borderline activities
are so sensitive to the possibilities of stepping over the line or
being caught over the line at a future date that they are usually
amenable to our suggestion that some negotiation be entered into
and worked out, not based upon actual criminal violation but the
authority of the office to step in when one subsequently develops 3 10
In cases where negotiations fail and the detective believes that prosecution
is not warranted, he will record the complaint and advise the consumer
to seek the services of a private attorney, the legal aid society, or a magis-
trate.31 ' However, if a large number of charges are leveled against one
company and attempts at negotiations have failed, a complete investigation
will be conducted to ascertain if grounds for criminal prosecution exist.
Most district attorneys unfortunately do not offer these services. As
an attorney in one Pennsylvania county wrote to the Philadelphia frauds
division: "As you are probably aware, our District Attorney's office out
here is in no real position to handle any of these fraud complaints and gen-
erally does not even keep any records in regard to the complaints primarily
because they are not equipped to handle them." 12 Even a large city like
Pittsburgh lacks any formal program to aid defrauded consumers since,
as stated by an assistant district attorney, "our work force is too small
and we are swamped with burglaries, murders, and habeas corpus applica-
tions." Although some effort is made to arrange settlements, the fear of
a rash of complaints leads to the policy that "we don't want to publicize
what we do."
In addition to helping the consumer settle his disputes and sending
him to the agencies that can best serve him, the presence of a fraTds division
serves to bring more cases of criminal fraud to the attention of the district
308 Although no money ever passes through the hands of members of the frauds
division staff, it is estimated that more than a $100,000 a year is recovered by con-
sumers as a result of the division's intervention.
309 When the frauds division had received twenty-two complaints about a par-
ticular freezer company, the company was informed "that if there were any recur-
rences of complaints . . . then our office would have to take a very serious view
toward the situation and take action against the company." Frauds Division Files.
310 Donolow Committee Hearings, May 10, 1962, at 113.
311 During 1964, 1,150 complaints were received by the Frauds Division. Of these
524 were adjusted and closed, 147 were referred to others, and A79 were considered
unfounded. Figures released by Philadelphia District Attorney's Office.
3 12 Frauds Division Files.
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attorney's office. By putting unethical businessmen on notice that their
activities are under surveillance, the frauds division also discourages many
fraudulent schemes before they begin.
D. The Minor Judiciary and the Small Claims Court
Tom's "arrest" for failure to pay the finance company,3 13 clearly a
violation of "a fundamental principle of law that a criminal prosecution
may not be used to collect a civil debt," 314 provides an extreme example of
the flagrant misuse of legal process by the minor judiciary.
Tactics such as those employed against Tom have been used by col-
lection agencies, constables and local magistrates in Philadelphia. 15 Other
practices also aimed at harassing alleged debtors have included vicious
dunning letters, abusive telephone calls and in one reported case a debtor
was even threatened with a revolver to insure payment.3 16 Even though
statutes provide the consumer with a forum where he can present a fraud
claim against a company or offer the defense of misrepresentation against a
claim for money owed, he may still be denied a fair disposition of his case.
If a debtor is accorded a hearing in magistrate's court, he may be
denied the fundamental right of having an impartial judge decide his case.
Many lawyers inform debtors that, because of the connection between the
constable and the magistrate, "any attempt to resist collection is futile . . .
even though the debtor has a valid defense." 3 17 Indeed the "plaintiff won
more than ninety-nine percent of the cases heard in those courts." 3-1
Some Philadelphia magistrates, moreover, have repeatedly violated the
Pennsylvania Constitution 3 19 by adjudicating cases which involve over 100
dollars and therefore are outside their jurisdiction.3 20 In addition, magis-
trates have refused to follow court cases holding that debt in excess of 100
dollars cannot be waived or remitted by the plaintiff in order to give the
magistrate jurisdiction.3 1
If Tom had paid for his carpeting and then sued in a magistrate's
court for a refund, he most likely would have received a judgment in his
favor, since virtually all plaintiffs succeed,3 22 but he would have been faced
with a number of difficulties collecting it. Magistrates may refuse to fulfill
their statutory duty of granting the writ of execution on the judgment,.
3
and both the constable, who attempts to collect the judgment, and the
313 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
3 14 MAGISTRATES RPORT 439; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 257 (1953).
315 For a thorough study of this process see "The Collection Mill," MAGISTRATES
REPORT 422-52.
316 Id. at 27.
317 See ibid.
318 Id. at 398.
319 PA. CONST. art. V, § 12.
320 MAGISTRATES REPORT 350-51.
3 21 Id. at 351-55.
322 See note 318 supra and accompanying text
323 MAGISTRATES REPORT 400-04.
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magistrate may charge rates in excess of the maximum set by statute.324
Execution may not be successful, however, even if these difficulties are
overcome, since the defendant is often an undercapitalized or fly by night
corporation with no assets.
Thirty-four states have found "the old-fashioned method of allowing
small causes to be determined by untrained justices of the peace . . .
entirely unsatisfactory" 325 and have inaugurated a system of courts de-
voted to the settling of small claims.3 26 These courts are specially organ-
ized so as to provide "a simple, informal and inexpensive procedure for the
prompt determination of such claims in accordance with the rules and
principles of substantive law." 327 Informal procedures adopted by many
of these courts include increased conciliation attempts, service of process
by mail, waiver of many of the technical rules of evidence, elimination of
a jury, limited right of appeal, and increased control of the hearing by the
judge, who is given discretion to determine whether witnesses should be
called, and to set what he considers realistic terms for payment of a judg-
ment.328 The inexpensiveness of litigating in these courts 329 has insured
that "many well-founded claims are presented which would never have seen
light of day because of the expense in bringing suit." 
330
Some small claims courts bar attorneys, 331 literally accepting Roscoe
Pound's view that "it is a denial of justice in small causes to drive litigants
to employ lawyers . . .. " 332 The California District Court of Appeals
in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court33 3 decided that such a bar
was necessary to fulfill the courts' basic functions: "If one of the litigants
in such a court could employ counsel it would of necessity mean that the
poor untrained litigant who could not afford to pay such costs would be at
a disadvantage." 3 34 The court held the provision not to be a denial of
due process on the ground that, if the plaintiff wished an attorney, he
could bring his claim in other courts, and the defendant similarly could not
324 Id. at 416-18.
325 Scott, Small Causes and Poor Litigants, 9 A.BA.J. 457 (1923).
326 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1955, Supp. 1959) [hereinafter cited as SMALL CLAIMS COURTS].
For a detailed analysis of these courts see id. at 1-18 (Supp. 1959) ; id. at 1-48 (1955).
827 N.Y. JuDIciARY LAw § 1802.
82 8 SMALL CLAIMS COURTS 1-2.
329 California, for example, charges a fee of one dollar for filing of an affidavit
and commencement of an action, one dollar for each copy mailed to a defendant, and
one dollar for issuance of the writ of execution. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 117(p).
For a booklet informing the public of these minimal charges see CALIFORNIA COX-
SUMER COUNSEL, How To USE THE SMALL. CLAIMS COURT.
330 SMALL. CLAIMS COURTS 11.
831 Id. at 9.
332 Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REv.
302, 318 (1913).
833 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d 38 (Dist. Ct App. 1946).
34 Id. at 383, 173 P.2d at 40-41.
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complain as he had a right to appeal from the small claims court to the
superior court, where he would be entitled to a trial de novo.335
Permitting the attendance of attorneys in small claims courts tends
to hinder the attempt to conduct a simple and informal trial. A District
of Columbia court, for example, felt constrained to hold that it was improper
for a judge in a small claims court to conduct direct examination of the
plaintiff, to rule out some of plaintiff's testimony as irrelevant before
allowing his attorney to examine him, and to intimate during the proceed-
ing that the plaintiff would be unsuccessful. 336 The statement in the court's
opinion that "it was never intended that . . . there be any interference
with [lawyer's] traditional functions" 337 is contrary to Dean Pound's view
that wide latitude should be given to a judge who "represents both parties
and the law . . . [in order that he can] get away from the involved and
over-mechanical procedure which has become in so many jurisdictions a
means afforded each party of hindering the other in his search for
justice." 338
IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The federal government's direct concern for a full scale program of
consumer protection is a very recent development. In March, 1962, Presi-
dent Kennedy became the first chief executive to send a special message
on consumer interests to Congress.33 9 None of the earlier efforts by
national officials to "bring the consumer point of view into the federal
government" resulted in permanent representation.3 40  Reasons suggested
to explain the "succession of 'failures'" include: an historical conception
of "consumer advice" as only part of an emergency plan; the unpopularity
of consumer advisors with organizations to which they are attached; and a
failure to recognize that consumers need attention more specific than the
general mandate given to governmental agencies to further the "public
interest." 341
President Kennedy, in an attempt to ensure the consumer interest a
continuous voice in the federal government, created the Consumer Advisory
Council to suggest legislation and to advise the president.342
Initially, the Council was hampered by limited staff and funds.3 43 In
its first year it concentrated on familiarizing itself with the existing pro-
grams and practices of the federal agencies in order to determine how these
organizations could be better utilized.344 The Council's proposals for legis-
.335d. at 382, 173 P.2d at 40; accord, Foster v. Walus, 81 Idaho 452, 347 P.2d
120 (1959).3 38 Gaddis v. Hongell, 117 A.2d 230 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955).
337 Id. at 231.
338 Pound, supra note 332, at 319.
339 CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL ANN. REP. 5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
COUcCIL REPORT]. For the text of the message see 108 CONG. REc. 4167-4171 (1962).
840 COUNCIL REPORT 30.
341 Ibid.
342 108 CoNG. REc. 4169 (1962).
343 COUNCIL REPORT 8.
3
44 Id. at 9.
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lative and procedural change were then channeled to appropriate members
of the administration.
3 45
A second directive from President Kennedy called for designation of
special assistants in each of the twenty-two federal agencies whose activities
bear significantly on consumer welfare.3 4 6 The assistants were to promote
the consumer interest in all actions taken by these agencies.347 This
program began with considerable publicity and included a general invitation
to send complaints of consumer fraud to the White House.3 4s However,
it has resulted that "small consumers . . . who have sought practical
concrete advice on how to obtain satisfaction for their complaints in spe-
cific cases have been disappointed. Indeed, . . . there has been a reversal
of policy and word has apparently gone out that attention to problems in
such detail has not been found practicable." 349
President Johnson also sent a consumer message to Congress,3 50 in an
attempt to implement the Consumer Advisory Council's recommendation
for stronger and more effective representation at the presidential level. 35'
He appointed a new Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs and established
the President's Committee on Consumer Interests which was to conduct
a series of regional conferences, examine existing programs aimed at pro-
viding consumer information to families and expand consumer programs in
the schools.
352
Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson called for specific legislation,
including proposals to strengthen present laws covering food, drugs, and
cosmetics which "are inadequate to assure the necessary protection the
consumer deserves." 3 53 Each chief executive also supported "truth in
lending" 3 and "truth in packaging" 355 bills, and praised agency work
in the federal government's two most significant direct fraud prevention
programs-the Post Office's mail fraud jurisdiction and the Federal Trade
Commission's power to take action against false advertising.3 56
45Ibid. For a summary of the Council's accomplishments, see id. at 9-10.
346 108 CoNTG. REc. 4169 (1962). For a list of the agencies see CouNcil.
REPORT 7.
347 108 CoNG. REc. 4169 (1962).
348 Consumer Bull., Nov. 1964, p. 18.
349 Ibid.
So 110 CONG. RFc. 1958-1960 (1964).
851 CouNcn REPORT 30.
852 110 CoNG. REc. 1960 (1964). The Committee consists of representatives of
the federal agencies most concerned with consumer affairs and members of the Con-
sumer Advisory Council with the Presidential Assistant as chairman. Id. at 1958.
853 108 CoNG. REc. 4169 (1962); see 110 CONG. REc. 1959 (1964).
354 For present bills see S. 2275, H.RL 111, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
355 For present bills see S. 985, H.R. 1664, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
355 The statutes, passed originally in 1872, were the earliest federal legislation
concerned directly with consumer protection. CouNc. REPORT 24.
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A. The Post Office
The two postal fraud statutes-the first providing criminal penalties
for use of the mail to defraud,357 the second an administrative statute em-
powering the Postmaster General to stop incoming mail from reaching
the fraudulent operator 35 -- constitute effective weapons for governmental
protection of the consumer.3 59 Due to the postal authorities' effective use
of these statutes "the smart guys have been forced to avoid carefully the
use of the mails." ;Bo
If the referral scheme which the salesman outlined to Tom 361 had been
described in a letter, a complaint that he had been defrauded could have
been made at one of fifteen postal inspection headquarters.36 2  Despite
official policy that "the Post Office Department has no authority to recover
your money or property or take any action to adjust an unsatisfactory
transaction," 363 some inspectors will begin processing a consumer's com-
plaint of mail fraud,3 4 even if solely a civil question is involved,365 by
attempting to resolve any difficulty with a telephone call or letter to the
offending seller. If the postal inspector, after detailed investigation, con-
cludes that a criminal action should be instituted, his finding of "intent to
defraud" is submitted to a United States attorney, who decides whether
prosecution is warranted.368
Due in large measure to the courts' interpretation of the liberal crim-
inal fraud statute, conviction followed prosecution in ninety-nine percent
of the cases tried in fiscal 1964.367 Less needs to be proved to obtain a
conviction under the mail fraud statute than is required for criminal fraud
35718 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
358 74 Stat. 654 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
359 110 CONG. REC. 1958 (1964) ; 108 CoNG. REc. 4168-71 (1962).
360 Interview With Assistant United States Attorney.
361 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
362 Interview With Postal Inspector, Philadelphia Post Office.
363 U.S. POST OFFICE DEP'T, HOW THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE PROTECTS
You AGAINST MAIL FRAUD (1964).
364 Most such complaints are made directly by consumers. Interview With Postal
Inspector, Philadelphia Post Office. Of the small number of complaints that do not
come directly from consumers, by far the majority originate with consumer complaints
to postmasters, local law enforcement agencies, and federal agencies such as the FTC
and the FBI.3 6 5 The Philadelphia Post Office settles over a thousand complaints a year, both
civil matters and potential violations of the mail fraud statute, by this informal
method. The procedure adopted by the Post Office is similar to that adopted by the
Philadelphia District Attorney's office. See notes 304-07 supra and accompanying
text.
366 POST OFFICE DEP'T, THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE (1963).
367 Figures Released by the Post Office Department. These figures are the same
for fiscal 1962. POST OFFICE DEP'T, THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE (1963). Dur-
ing fiscal 1964, 709 mail fraud arrests were obtained, 4,779 questionable promotions
were discontinued, and 119,092 complaints were received. Hearing Before the House
Subcommittee on Appropriations, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Post Office Appropriation]. But cf. New Republic, Aug. 21, 1965, p. 7 (suggesting
that the 99% conviction rate in all Post Office cases results from fact that "the vast
majority of cases . . . are never brought to trial, either because of insufficient
evidence or because an investigation has shaken up a suspect enough to make him
stop his supposed violation").
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prosecution under the law of most states.8 68 The federal statute only
requires proof of "(1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the mailing of a letter,
etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme." 369 There is no requirement
that anyone be defrauded or even that a likelihood exist that someone will be
defrauded.370 Misrepresentation of an existing fact need not be shown.
It is only necessary to prove use of the mails to further a scheme designed
to deceive persons of ordinary prudence.8 71 Thus, a scheme to defraud can
be found if consumers of reasonable prudence are led to believe that they
will obtain something worth more than its actual value, even if "the
articles to be sold will approximate in commercial value the price to be
asked and received." 872 In short, courts "will find fraud in the type of
exaggeration of the worth of goods--'trader's talk' or 'puffing,' as it is
called,-which is tolerated in the law of civil liability." 373
While proof of intent to defraud is a reasonable requisite for conviction
under the criminal statute,3 74 the effectiveness of the Post Office is impaired
by the Supreme Court's interpretation requiring a similar showing under
the administrative statute.3 75 In Reilly v. Pinkus 376 the Court reasoned
that while the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to issue cease
and desist orders without proof of fraudulent intent,377 the FTC order
"does not approach the severity of a mail fraud order" 378 which prevents
the fraudulent seller from receiving mail. The Court stated that though
an FTC order would force a business to change certain policies the business
would be able to sell its product as before while a Postmaster's order, pre-
venting an offender from receiving incoming mail, "could wholly destroy
a business." 379
The Court did not consider, however, that just as an individual who
conforms to an FTC cease and desist order can continue to operate his
business, so can a postal offender receive his mail and maintain his business
if he stops the misleading practice. Furthermore, the requirement of
finding intent to defraud is not necessary to fulfill the statutory purpose
868 See discussion of state false pretenses statutes, notes 227-233 mtpra and ac-
companying text.
369 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
370E.g., Hermansen v. United States, 230 F.2d 173-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 924 (1956); United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96, 106 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 943 (1952).
8 7 1 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 213 F.2d 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 828 (1954); Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 565 (1932).
372 Rude v. United States, 74 F.2d 673, 676 (10th Cir. 1935).
373 United States v. Whitmore, 97 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
374 The Post Office agrees that it is "fair and equitable" to have to prove intent
in a criminal prosecution. REPORT ON FRAUDs 78 (testimony of Henry B. Montague,
Chief Postal Inspector).
375 74 Stat. 654 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
376 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
377 See 38 Stat. 718 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
378 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 277 (1949).
379 Ibid.
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which is to afford "the necessary protection in preventing the operator from
receiving the remittance from the public," s0 rather than to punish the
violator. Moreover, the difficulty in obtaining the necessary evidence to
establish intent makes rapid action against offenders much less likely and
thus hampers public protection.3 81 This problem is further complicated by
the Post Office's lack of subpoena power, which forces it to rely in many
instances on a prima facie showing of intent.
38 2
A solution to this Post Office dilemma has been offered in a recent
Senate amendment.3 83 It eliminates the requirement of proving intent
precedent to administrative action by deleting the word "fraudulent" from
the statute and substituting the word "misleading." Furthermore, the
amendment explicitly states that the required pretenses, representations
and promises need not be intentional.384 Adoption of the amendment would
greatly strengthen the Post Office's ability to curb fraudulent mail practices.
Notwithstanding the difficulties imposed by the present interpretation
of the administrative statute, the postal inspectors have a reputation for
rapid processing of complaints. Although hampered by a small staff385
and an increasing number of charges of mail fraud,3 86 their authority to
reach activities beyond those which the states are empowered to control
combined with some success in obtaining restitution for defrauded buyers,
38 7
leads many consumers to turn more readily to the Post Office than to local
law enforcement agencies.3 88
B. Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction over "deceptive acts or
practices" 38 19 in advertising represents another major governmental effort
in the fraud prevention field. The Commission initially had to formulate
"some minimal standard of public competence below which the law will
380111 CONG. REC. 3997 (daily ed. March 4, 1965) (statement of Chief Postal
Inspector Montague).
381 See REPORT ON FRAUDS 78.
382 Ill CONG. REC. 3997 (daily ed. March 4, 1965) (statement of Chief Postal
Inspector Montague).
383 S. 1364, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
84 S. 1364, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1965).
385 See description of mail fraud activities and limitations and request for 15
additional inspectors. Post Office Appropriations 190-91, 196.
3 8 6 CHEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, POST OFFICE DEP'T, 30 INSPECTION SERVICE BuL-
TIN 14 (April-May 1965).
87 Refunds, either voluntary or court ordered, amounted to over nine million
dollars in fiscal 1964. Post Office Appropriations 190. The Postal Inspection Service
states, however, that "the American public is bilked of over a $100 million a year
through mail fraud." POST OFFICE DEP'T, How THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERVIcE
PROTECTS You AGAINST MAIL FRAUD (1964).
388 Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
38952 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1) (1964). "The
framers and enactors [of the Federal Trade Commission Act] were not even con-
cerned with the problem of false advertising." Millstein, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 439, 450 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Millstein]. Yet it has been said that the FTC's greatest accomplishments have
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afford no protection against deception." 39 0 Rather than adopt the rea-
sonable man standard, "the FTC has selected an extremely low intelligence
level," 391 with the result that practices, which would not deceive a reason-
able man are prohibited and "the courts have not significantly disturbed
its determination . .. ,, 392 Thus, in Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp.
v. FTC,39 3 the petitioner contended that the advertisement of its cosmetic
preparation "Rejuvenescence" was not deceptive, on the ground that "no
straight-thinking person could believe that its cream would actually re-
juvenate." 3 94 The court rejected this contention reasoning that "while
the wise and the worldly" would realize that the misrepresentations were
false, "there remains 'that vast multitude' of others who, like Ponce de Leon,
still seek a perpetual fountain of youth." 395
In other areas the courts have also permitted the FTC wide latitude to
develop broad concepts in the determination of what constitutes deceptive
advertising. Thus the standard of "literal truthfulness" 396 has been ex-
tended to prohibit advertisements literally correct but phrased to create
misleading impressions, 397 and those in which material facts are not re-
vealed.39 8 Furthermore, while mere expressions of personal evaluations of
a product's intangible qualities may not constitute an actionable promise,
if the superlative can be disproved objectively, the Commission may order
the advertising stopped by considering it outside the area of "trade
puffing." a
Despite the FTC's broad reach, its efforts, as well as those of legis-
lative and other self-regulatory bodies, have been branded as "notoriously
been in the elimination of deceptive practices. Weston, Deceptive Practices and the
Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 549 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Weston]. During fiscal 1964, more than a half million radio
and television scripts and a quarter of a million pages of printed material were
screened by the FTC. "From this total, 42,646 advertisements were forwarded for
consideration by the legal staff." 1964 FTC ANN. REP. 16.
390 Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLtJm. L. Rv. 1018, 1030 (1956).
391 Millstein 458; see id. at 458-62. Indeed Millstein states that this intelligence
level is "remarkably low-so low in fact that one may rightly wonder why no sig-
nificant challenge has been made in the courts to this possibly unconstitutional
abridgement of speech." Id. at 462.
892 Id. at 458.
393 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
394 Id. at 679.
395 Id. at 680.
396 Id. at 680, citing Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
397 See Millstein 466-68 & n.119; Weston 556; Note, 56 COLUm. L. Rv. 1018,
1027 (1956). Another aspect of this rule condemns the truthful statement which
does not support the product claim. Millstein 468.
398 The Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938 introduced the statutory concept that
failure to reveal certain important information may be considered unfair and decep-
tive in the advertising of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics. 52 Stat. 114 (1938),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1) (1964). The courts have permitted the FTC
to apply this principle in reviewing advertisements of other kinds of products.
Weston 556-57.
399 Millstein 469. While the line between objective and subjective claims is
difficult to draw, courts have generally upheld the Commission's decision. Id. at
469-70.
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ineffective." 40 0 The basic cause of this ineffectiveness is the limited scope
of the Commission's enforcement powers. The Commission "had no power
of its own to imprison, fine, or assess or award damages. Its maximum
authority is to issue an order to 'cease and desist,' and even this order can
be appealed to the courts within 60 days after it is issued." 401 These
problems have led a Senate subcommittee, after full investigation of the
work of the FTC, to question whether even "proposed improvements
would be more than patches on an old structure in need of thorough
examination." 402
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the FTC's power to issue cease and
desist orders has been severely hampered "by the Commission's inability
to make expeditious determinations." 403 Cases take about a year to reach
the Commission level for issuance of a complaint.4 4  At this time, the
respondent can consent to a cease and desist order without admitting any
violation of the law.40 5  If consent is not obtained, however, there is
frequently a delay of three to five years between issuance of the complaint
and the time when a cease and desist order becomes final through exhaustion
of the last opportunity for appeal. 40 6 During this period the objectionable
practice will continue, as the FTC Chairman stated, even "if on its face it
is . . . phony, and we can show upon the record the irreparable harm
and injury that will come to the public." 407 This administrative lag is so
long that it has been suggested on more than one occasion that some
affluent advertisers deliberately take advantage of complex Commission pro-
cedures and court struggles in order to continue sales of misrepresented,
but lucrative products for as long as they possibly can.
40
8
Many of those interviewed pointed to the continued operation of the
Holland Furnace Company as a "classic example" of administrative in-
efficiency. Complaints about the high-pressure tactics of Holland salesmen
can be traced as far back as the early 1930's.409 In December, 1936, after
an FTC investigation, a stipulation was filed whereby the company agreed
to cease and desist from using certain misleading advertising claims.410
Although the FTC and various better business bureaus continued to receive
400 Warne, Advertising-A Critic's View, J. Marketing, Oct. 1962, p. 13. See
also criticisms of the FTC in Weston 548 n.4. But see OGILVY, CoNFEssIONs OF AN
ADVERTISING MAN 93 (1963) (advertising executive's fear of the FTC), and Weston
549 (statements of defenders of FTC effectiveness).
401 FTC, HERE IS YOUR FEDRAL. TRADE CommissioN 4 (1964).
402 REPORT oN FRAuDs 85.
403 Note, 56 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1018, 1035 (1956). See generally Weston 563-65.
40 4 
REPORT ON FAUDS 81 (testimony of FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon).
405 Ibid.
406 Weston 561. The use of delaying tactics by skilled lawyers "can sometimes
postpone the day of reckoning even longer." Ibid.
40 7 REPORT ON FRAUDS 82-87; accord, Weston 561.
408 REPoRT ON FRAUDS 82.
409 Consumer Bull., April 1965, p. 25.
41024 F.T.C. 1413-14 (1936). Holland "agreed to cease and desist from the use
in its advertising matter, or otherwise, of the statement, 'Find out why only Holland
can guarantee perfect heat in every room .... y"
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numerous complaints about Holland's activities,411 it was not until May of
1954 that a second complaint was entered by the FTC.412 Four years later
a cease and desist order was issued prohibiting Holland "from en-
gaging in a sales scheme . . .whereby salesmen gain access to homes
by misrepresenting themselves as official 'inspectors' and 'heating engineers'
and thereafter dismantling furnaces on the pretext that this is necessary
to determine the extent of necessary repairs." 413
The company refused even at this juncture to discontinue its deceptive
practices and seven years passed before company officials were heavily
fined for disobeying a court order enforcing a 1958 cease and desist order.4 14
In the fields of drugs, food, devices or cosmetics, the Commission has
the power, although unfortunately it is seldom used,415 to petition the court
to enjoin the dissemination of any advertisement that is not in the public
interest.416 This temporary injunction remains in effect until the complaint
is dismissed by the Commission, or the order to cease and desist becomes
final or is set aside by the court on review. In other areas, however, the
FTC cannot apply for an injunction until after a cease and desist order
has been issued and respondent has exercised an option to appeal. 417 Both
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have supported proposals which would
permit the FTC to issue preliminary injunctions in all advertising fields
without court application. 418 Bills to this effect" 19 have been strongly
opposed and have little prospect of enactment. °20 Experts in FTC pro-
cedure have proposed, as a "logical solution," 421 expansion of the FTC's
temporary injunction powers in the drug, food, device and cosmetic area 42
to include all types of products and an explicit liberalization of the tests
courts apply in granting such injunctions.
411 Consumer Bull., April 1965, pp. 25-26.
412 Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55 (1958).
413 Id. at 91. The Commission's order was upheld by the circuit court in Holland
Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960),
and again in Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
414 In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
924 (1965).
415 Weston 551-52 & n.26.
416 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
417 Note, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1035 n.95 (1956) ; see 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964). Weston notes that in one case the FTC obtained
a preliminary injunction to stop a lottery pending the appeal, but "for some reason
the FTC does not appear to have pressed this precedent to any extent. . . ." Weston
561 n.111.
418 110 CONG. R~c. 1959 (1964); 108 CONG. REc. 4170 (1962).
419 E.g., H.R. 8830, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961); Weston 562 n.113.
420 REPoRT oN FRasuDs 83; Millstein 493 n.263; Weston 562.
421 Millstein 493.
422 See note 413 smpra and accompanying text.
423 Millstein 493; Weston 562-63. Weston suggests that they should have to
find only that the type of violation alleged has previously been labelled unfair by the
courts; that respondent is using such a practice; and that there is a likelihood that
consumers or competitors might be hurt by its continuation. Weston 563. Millstein
believes that such applications should "be judged by the common law standards ap-
plicable to the granting of such drastic relief." Millstein 493.
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C. Suggested Federal Programs
The increased attention given the federal government's consumer pro-
tection activities, has generated a new approach to consumer problems.
Many of the seeds for a change in philosophy were planted by a citizen's
advisory committee's study of the programs and policies of the federal Food
and Drug Administration.424  The recommendations resulting from this
study differed from the usual requests for additional legislation or changes
in investigation and prosecution activities. Instead, the citizen's commit-
tee suggested that the FDA concentrate its activities on a program of
public education in consumer protection and development of an industry
self-regulation program.425 To improve federal-state cooperation, the
report urged the development of FDA programs to strengthen the state
laws and administrative agencies, a thorough study of state capabilities,
improved federal-state training programs, and the development of a genuine
interest throughout the FDA in obtaining the greatest possible consumer
protection by coordinated harnessing of all regulatory programs-federal,
state and local. 42A
As suggested by the Chairman of the American Bar Association Sub-
committee on Regulations Affecting Advertising, the Report's overall view
that "the philosophy of administration should be reoriented," 427 seems
"equally applicable, in part at least, to the FTC." 428 He called for an
overhaul of the FTC's function whereby:
The commission should occupy a primus inter pares role with
respect to state agencies: encouraging passage of needed legisla-
tion; offering advice and possibly assistance in litigation and the
formulation of guides; becoming the focal point of coordination
among state agencies to avoid inconsistencies; referring complaints
of an essentially local nature to state agencies; and, in general,
developing programs designed to urge and aid state agencies to
adopt a rational but consistent approach to local advertising,
thereby relieving the Commission of a host of essentially local
matters.2
9
The suggestion that the FTC "doff its almost exclusively prosecutorial
hat and don that of advisor and coordinator to the states' attorneys general
and to self-regulatory bodies," 430 was more clearly defined and explained
4 2 4 
REPORT OF SECOND CITIZENS ADVISORY CommrrTE ON THE FOOD & DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (1962) (report to Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare).
425 Id. at 14-15.
426 Id. at 10.
427 Id. at 14.
428 Millstein 498.
429 Id. at 497.
430 Id. at 495.
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in the Federal Bar Journal's symposium. Besides outlining specific pro-
grams for state coordination and legislation, a section of the symposium
suggested methods by which the FTC could stimulate self-regulation.
43
1
It also proposed that the Commission enhance the effectiveness of consumer
organizations, by encouraging these groups to publish forms to facilitate
consumer filing of complaints and by giving greater aid to consumer organ-
izations in product testing.43 2 This philosophy of the role of the FDA and
the FTC is representative of the need for emphasizing the federal govern-
ment's role as advisor and coordinator in each of the other twenty agencies
engaged in consumer activities. 43 3  Fraud can be greatly reduced if gov-
ernmental organizations join with state and local law enforcement officials
and private groups in a coordinated program.
V. EDUCATION
Everyone interviewed for this study emphasized the importance of
consumer education as a method of combating unethical business practices.
While recognition of the need for consumer education has spurred the
development of programs by numerous organizations, many persons share
the concern of a better business bureau official who questions whether the
programs "reach people for whom they are intended." 434 A massive drive
by every group concerned to reach all consumers, especially "the poor who
suffer most from sharp practices," 435 has been suggested as the only long
term solution.
President Johnson's message to Congress on consumer interests 436
presented an excellent outline from which the needed advances in consumer
education can be developed. He directed his Committee on Consumer
Interests to :
"Examine the many programs for consumer education in our
schools." 437
If schools are to prepare a youth adequately for society, they must
teach him how to make intelligent decisions in the market place. A plan
with this goal has been introduced in a New York high school which pro-
vides programs concerning the decisions involved in purchasing auto-
mobiles, the intricacies in reading labels with their "semi-hidden informa-
tion," and the techniques of a "bait and switch" sale.4 38  Consumer
education also is integrated into the mathematics course by teaching
431 Weston at 575-77.
432 Id. at 577.
433 See note 346 supra and accompanying text.
434 REPORT ON FRAuDs 21 (testimony on efforts to warn elderly and others
against danger of quackery and other consumer frauds and misrepresentations).
435 110 CONG. REc. 1958, 1960 (1964).
436Id. at 1958.
43T Id. at 1960. (Emphasis added.)
438 N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1965, § 4, p. 7.
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students how to deterrhine the real cost of a loan and an installment pur-
chase. English classes include an analysis of the advertising agency's
"propaganda techniques." 43 9  Another approach has been adopted by the
Philadelphia school system which distributes a series of skits for children in
the lower grades to perform, depicting some of the more typical fraudulent
schemes that the student may encounter as an adult.440
"[D]evelop as promptly as possible effective ways and means of
reaching more homes and more families-particularly low-income families-
with information to help them get the most for their money." 441
Great quantities of information are available to interested individuals.
Two magazines, Consumer Reports and Consumer Bulletin, are published
monthly by organizations which are often commended for their "excellent
product-testing and educational endeavors." 442 A congressional survey of
government protection activities also reported that eight agencies conduct
direct consumer education programs.443 In addition, many state consumer
councils publish booklets which are made available to interested individuals
and groups,44 4 and the better business bureaus offer for sale, at a nominal
sum, a series of booklets that warn against fraudulent schemes. 44 5
Yet, as President Johnson has indicated, these publications "often do
not penetrate to the lowest 20 percent of the nation's income groups." 446
The median income of a Consumer Report subscriber, for example, is over
10,000 dollars a year, and he has a college degree."T While consumer
439 Ibid. The New York Times reports that this model for consumer educa-
tion in schools "has not been greeted with unqualified enthusiasm." An article in
a newsletter published by Grey Advertising, Inc. "expressed concern that consumer
education might be brainwashing." Ibid.
440 Thirteen of these skits are on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Penn-
sylvania. They include "The Settlement House Racket," "The C.O.D. Racket,"
"The Vanishing Suit" and "Just Sign on the Dotted Line."
441 110 CONG. REc. 1960 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
442 Weston 558. Besides publishing monthly magazines and an annual compila-
tion of product tests, these consumer organizations perform other valuable functions.
Consumers Union testifies before congressional committees in support of consumer
protection legislation, supports outside research organizations such as the Survey
Research at the University of Michigan, and supports various movements that will
aid the public such as the campaign stressing the importance of seat belts and better
medical care. Sales Management, April 2, 1965, p. 26. Consumers Research sends
slides and booklets to schools as part of its consumer education program, lectures to
various church and civic groups, and writes books on consumer topics. Interview
With F. J. Schlink, President and Technical Director, Consumers Research.
443 House Comm. on Government Operation, Consumer Protection Activities of
Federal Departments and Agencies. H.R. REP. No. 1241, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1961). One example is the Federal Trade Commission's publication of guides against
deceptive advertising practices. Ibid.
444 E.g., note 291 supra (New York); CALIFORNIA CONSUMER COUNSEL REP. 31
(1962) (publication of "Credit Costs Money-Know How Much It Costs You," "New
Consumer Laws Protect You," "How To Use the Small Claims Court."), Wisconsin
Department of Agriculture's Consumer's Guide to Careful Buying; Attorney General
of Michigan's Consumer Handbook.
445 Better Business Bureau, Fact Booklets (list of 24 booklets available to the
public).
446 110 CoNG. Rac. 1960 (1964).
447 Interview With Dr. Colston E. Warne, President of Consumers Union.
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magazines are subject to the criticism that "they have neglected to make
sufficient use of the techniques of modern advertising to build their mem-
bership[s]," 4 8 much of the problem appears to stem from the fact that
poor people, even if cognizant of the existence of consumer magazines,
would not read or buy them. 9 Publications of federal agencies and those
of state and local organizations also do not reach the public in large
numbers. Most booklets are available only on request, and the individual
who writes for such information generally is not the person who most needs
protection from fraud.450 While many consumer organizations attempt
wide dissemination of information,451 most members of the public usually
hear or read only spot announcements by the better business bureau or
accounts of particularly egregious frauds in local newspapers.
4 52
Many doubt whether the present availability of such information can
change purchasing habits and call for new and expanded techniques which
will reach low income groups. The better business bureau's program of
making announcements in the mass media about fraudulent operations 453
should be expanded and local chambers of commerce in municipalities with-
out a bureau should assume this function. Newspapers also should be
encouraged to publish weekly columns to educate the public.45 Existing
programs by consumer oriented organizations for delivering lectures and
showing slides and movies 455 should be increased. Greater attempts must
also be made by these groups and the mass media to inform the consumer
of the procedures for registering effective complaints when he believes he
has been defrauded.456 In addition, attempts must be made to have those
individuals who work closely with the poor and elderly provide them with
448 Weston 558. Consuner Reports is the country's largest consumer magazine
with a circulation of more than 950,000. Interview With Dr. Colston E. Warne,
President of Consumers Union. Consumer Bulletin's circulation is 100,000. Inter-
view With F. J. Schlink, President and Technical Director, Consumers Research.
449 Dr. Colston E. Warne, President of Consumers Union reports that during the
1930's his organization published a special $1.00 edition geared to the poor consumer
as well as a $3.00 regular edition. Warne indicated that the more expensive edition
"did very well" while the special edition "did not sell"
450 Interview With Legal Aid Counsel.
451 Better Business Bureau publications, for example, are distributed to all member
organizations and their employees. Interview With Better Business Bureau Official.
452 Consensus of Interviews.
453 During 1964, the Bureau reported 79,418 radio spots and 23,212 television
announcements. BETTER BUSINESS BUREAu, STAmTscs FOR 1964 (1965).
454 Ohio Memorandum 4-5.
465 Members of the New York Bureau show thcir film "Caveat Emptor" to all
groups upon request N.Y. Report 7. Three Better Business Bureau films are
also available without charge, "The Better Business Bureau Story," "To Serve the
Living," and "Too Good To Be True." 43 The Shield, No. 1, Jan. 1, 1963.
4561n Caplovitz's study of low income consumers, he found that 64% could not
name a single agency dealing with protecting him from fraud. Only 3% of the
families said they would turn to a private lawyer if they were cheated by a
merchant Caplovitz, Consuner Problems, 23 LEGAL Am BRIEF CASE 143, 147
(1965). Consumer organizations are trying to remedy this situation by publicizing
their activities as well as those of other similar groups. See, e.g., "How To Com-
plain," The Herald Tribune, March 7, 1965, p. 4 (magazine); The Consumer in the
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reliable information. As stated by one commentator, "should we not in-
struct the various workers-doctors, nurses, social service personnel,
guidance specialists, and other caretakers-how to help people help them-
selves in their communities ?" 457
"[B]egin a series of regional consumer conferences" 458
The coordination of activities by representatives of consumer councils,
better business bureaus, manufacturers, advertising agencies, mass media,
retailers, and government agencies, could also be a useful way of eliminating
consumer ignorance. A step beyond the President's regional planning
meetings can be taken if each state and municipality similarily coordinates
plans to assure that every purchaser has adequate knowledge to make
intelligent decisions in the market Place.
As President Johnson stated to Congress:
[F] or far too long, the consumer has had too little voice and too
little weight in government.
As a worker, as a businessman, as a farmer, as a lawyer or
doctor, the citizen has been well represented. But as a consumer,
he has had to take a back seat. That situation is changing. The
consumer is moving forward. We cannot rest content until he is
in the front row, not displacing the interests of the producer, yet
gaining equal rank and representation with that interest ...
What is new is the concern for the total interest of the con-
sumer, the recognition of certain basic consumer rights: The right
to safety, the right to be informed, the right to choose, the right
to be heard.
4 59
Marketplace 6-8 (Consumers' Research, Inc. 1964), on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania; FTC, Fight Backl The Ungentle Art of Self Defense,
on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania; Attorney General of
Michigan's Consumers' Handbook.
4 5 7REPoRT ON FRATUJs 21 (testimony of Irving Ladimer, Vice President and
Director of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Division, National Better Business
Bureau, Inc.).
458 110 CoNG. REc. 1958, 1960 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
459 Id. at 1958. (Emphasis added.)
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